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ABSTRACT
AN INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITIVE AND NON-COMPETITIVE FRAMING
EFFECTS: INTERPRETING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELITE RHETORIC
AND SUPPORT FOR PREVENTIVE WAR
by
Jeffrey Guse
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
Under the Supervision of Professor Steven B. Redd

This dissertation examines how competitive and non-competitive framing
environments influence public opinion towards the use of preventive force. I attempt to
develop a theory that helps to explain which factors are responsible for influencing public
opinion for those who possess strong predispositions towards or against the use of force
in contrast to those who possess weak predispositions towards or against the use of force.
I test predictions based on my theory in two empirical chapters: a media content analysis
and a laboratory experiment. The media content analysis allows me to test whether there
is a significant difference between those who are exposed to non-competitive and
competitive framing environments from those who are not exposed to them. The
experimental chapter will allow me to test how framing effects work, in particular
whether or not those who possess strong predispositions are likely to be influenced by
frames that correspond to preconceived values and whether those who possess weak
predispositions are likely to be influence by frames based on the credibility of the source.
In addition, this chapter will examine how these factors hold in both competitive and
non-competitive framing environments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Framing Preventive War
President George W. Bush, when attempting to build popular support for the war
against Iraq and more broadly for his administration's preventive self-defense doctrine,
suggested that it was in the public's best interests for the US to accept the risks associated
with going to war in the present in order to avoid fighting a more painful, costly war
against Iraq in the future. In an address to the country on Iraq, Bush stated: “in 1 year, or
5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many
times over… we choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear
suddenly in our skies and cities” (2003: 340). The Bush administration’s “First Strike
Doctrine” is outlined in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United
States of America.
As President Bush and others before him discovered, there are built-in
electoral constraints against the use of preventive force, which suggest that costs be
minimized when initiating conflict. Preventive war is not designed to preempt specific
imminent threats, but to prevent subjective, generalized threats from materializing. The
threat posed by the adversary may take several years to develop. The consequence of
non-action is not an attack by the adversary, but the risk of a more costly war in the
future conducted in a position of relative inferiority compared to the present
circumstances. In short, the motives for fighting a preventive war are to fight what is
perceived as a winnable war now rather than fight a war under less favorable
circumstances later (Jervis 2003). Since the threat presented by the adversary may
not be visible or apparent in the present, the war might be extremely unpopular. Elites
may face a difficult time in achieving reelection if they have to market an unpopular war.
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It is important, therefore, to examine how elites can minimize such costs since
democratic elites are accountable to their public constituents. And at the same time, elites
face foreign policy crises created by adversaries that demand their attention and response.
Even though there have been previous studies examining the relationship between
public opinion and the uses of force (Berinsky 2006; Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 1992;
Mueller 1973), few extensive or systematic studies have been examined extensively
focusing on the relationship between the use of preventive force and public opinion. This
is a problem because empirically speaking, preventive wars do take place (e.g., Iraq,
Arab-Israeli War 1967) and therefore they demand our systematic scholarly and
empirical attention. Most previous work on preventive war has debated the
appropriateness of utilizing preventive strikes against adversarial targets, the role of
preemption and prevention in US foreign policy, historical cases to understand conditions
under which states are likely to adopt preventive based tactics, the correlation between
power shifts and conflict initiation, and the application of self-defense in dynamic
political environments (Doyle 2008; Gilpin 1975, 1981; Kim and Morrow 1992; Levy
1987; Niou and Ordeshook 1987; Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Shue and
Rodin 2007).
Furthermore, empirical research has largely assumed that democracies do not
engage in preventive war (Schweller 1992; Silverstone 2007). In democracies, leaders
will have a hard time mobilizing forces necessary to engage in preventive conflicts.
Preventive conflicts are associated with windows of opportunity which are conducted for
national glory, economic gain, and territorial acquisition when clear and present dangers
may not be present. As a result, the public might be averse to the costs associated with
preventive war. Scholars have suggested that preventive war should only be an attractive
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option for declining leaders in non-democratic states (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman
1992; Schweller 1992). And if they do engage in preventive uses of force, these uses of
force are usually short-lived with a clear-cut victory in mind. If we buy into this
assumption that democracies do not engage in preventive war due to the costs associated
with such conflict, then we have to rely on another untested assumption that elites are
unable to mitigate or lower the costs associated with such conflict by the way they
present information. And because preventive war is conducted in circumstances in which
threats may not be visibly apparent on the horizon, the topic presents a hard test case
concerning the plausibility that elites might be able to engage in framing effects to
increase support. It is also important to note that due to a failure to study such
phenomena empirically, we do not know which dynamics are therefore responsible for
driving public opinion in association with such conflicts.
Since the public depends on elites for information, this creates an incentive for
elites to manipulate information for public consumption. Dependence on elite
information sources is important because the average person may not have the ability to
monitor closely the events around the world. It is this ignorance that makes individuals
reliant on elites such as government officials, journalists, and foreign policy experts for
valuable information. Elites, therefore, attempt to control and spin information in such a
way that they gain an information advantage or propaganda advantage by maximizing
support for their position and minimize support for their opponent's position. Elites may
feel the need to respond to foreign policy crises that involve heavy costs in terms of
public support and opinion. It is therefore important to know whether or not elites are
able to shape such opinion based on the way they present information to their
constituents. Sometimes elites engage in competition with other elites when they engage
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in framing (Brewer and Gross 2005; Chong and Druckman 2007a; Sniderman and
Theriault 2004). At other times, elites might dominate the terms of debate when they
engage in framing (Brewer 2001; Iyengar 1991; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997; Price
and Tewksbury 1997). These elites, furthermore, have different levels of credibility. In
addition, elites themselves must take into consideration that they are presenting
information to their constituents who vary in terms of their sophistication towards the
issue and values they may possess. Some elites might have high levels of credibility
while others have low levels of credibility. Individual constituents, on the other hand,
vary in terms of the firmness of the opinion they hold towards the use of force and how
they are exposed to such information from elites.
Purpose

The general question that this dissertation wishes to address concerns how frames
work to influence public opinion for or against preventive war. Subsidiary questions in
association with this main question are listed below.
a) Do non-competitive frames influence public opinion? Do competitive frames
moderate public opinion?
b) How do non-competitive and competitive frames influence public opinion for
those who initially possess strong opinions towards the use of force in comparison to
those who initially possess weak opinions towards the use of force?
My purpose is to understand how elites are able to successfully frame preventive
war in competitive in comparison to non-competitive contexts.

To do this, the

dissertation will first center on the conditional limitations and psychological mechanisms
associated with framing effects utilizing preventive war as a subtext. The conditional
limitations of framing effects simply refer to the circumstances under which framing
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effects are successful or not. The psychological mechanisms center around whether the
individual buys into the frame based on central or peripheral mechanisms. If a person
buys into a frame based on central cues, according to Petty and Cacioppo (1984), this
results from a person's diligent consideration of information that she or he feels is central
to the merits of the attitudinal position. On the other hand, if a person buys into a frame
based on peripheral cues, then the person makes simple inferences about the merits of a
position based on simple cues. A framing effect occurs in political discourse when a
speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially viable considerations in the process of
describing events encourages individuals to focus on these particular considerations in
the process of constructing their overall opinion (Druckman 2001b).
Conceptual Framework

The main effect associated with influencing public opinion is the framing
environment in which the elites present information. Some individuals have well formed
opinions about the efficacy of the use of force whereas others may not be sure. If we are
to determine the degree to which an individual opposes or supports the use of force,
however, it is important to take into account the environment in which the information is
presented. Is only one side presenting information or are two competing sides presenting
information?

We should see differences in the degree to which public opinion is

influenced taking into account the framing environment in which information is provided.
Non-competitive frames should polarize public opinion; competitive frames should
moderate opinion.
Taking into account concepts such as elites, frames, framing environment, source
credibility, the following are my independent and dependent variables. The framing
environment, individual frames, and frame source all constitute independent variables in
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my model. The dependent variables constitute change in overall opinion, in particular
change in the direction as well as the degree of overall opinion and vote choice.
Moreover, I take into account the domestic and international context in my model. I
examine overall opinion in light of vote choice and opinion towards the use of preventive
force. Lastly, my model also takes into account changes in the underlying considerations
of public opinion.
Organization of Dissertation
Chapter I provides an introduction to the issues I will be examining in the
dissertation.

In chapter II, I review the mass communication and political science

literature (agenda setting, priming, and framing) as well as the preventive and preemptive
war literatures. My major purpose in the literature review is to discuss the conceptual
distinctions undergirding agenda setting, priming, and framing as they have been applied
to the international conflict literature. I then discuss the work that has been conducted on
preventive and preemptive war.

I conclude by pointing out ways in which this

dissertation will make a contribution to mass communication and political science as well
as preventive and preemptive war literatures.
In Chapter III, I explain the theoretical approach I will use to examine the
psychological mechanisms and conditional limitations associated with framing effects.
The theoretical approach I will use will generate predictions concerning these
psychological mechanisms and conditional limitations in the context of both noncompetitive and competitive framing environments.
In chapter IV, I present work associated with my first empirical chapter. In this
chapter, my objective is to simply uncover how framing effects work in competitive and
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non-competitive framing environments. In short, my main purpose is two-fold. First, I
want to see whether or not frames are likely to influence public opinion based on
exposure. I want to see whether or not individuals who are exposed to frames are more
likely to be influenced by frames in determining their overall opinion than individuals
who are not exposed to such frames. Second, I want to examine if the degree of the
framing effect should be more pronounced in non-competitive framing environments in
comparison to competitive framing environments.

To do this, I will explore the

relationship between framing and the 2004 US presidential election pitting George W.
Bush against John Kerry. I will conduct content analysis on one major newspaper, the
New York Times, from the first day after the end of the Republican Convention
(September 8, 2004) to the day of the presidential election, November 2, 2004. My
independent variables derived from the 2004 American National Election Studies
(ANES) data set consist of gender, ethnicity, ideology, race, age, education, political
knowledge, non-competitive and competitive frames. The dependent variable is vote
choice, for either Kerry or Bush. In this model, I want to determine whether individuals
that are exposed to political information from the newspaper determine their vote choice
based on the frames the newspaper focuses on the most.
In chapter V, I present results and analysis from my experimental study. In this
chapter, I examine the conditional limitations and psychological mechanisms behind
framing effects. In particular, I examine the influence of frames on those who have
initially strong opinions as well as initially weak opinions towards the use of force. The
independent variables include the frame (costs of delay/costs of escalation), the framing
environment (non-competitive/competitive), and frame source (credible/non-credible).
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The dependent variables concern change in overall opinion and changes to underlying
considerations associated with opinion. I want to see if individuals who possess initially
strong opinions are influenced by frames based on central cues such as informational
substance and individuals who possess initially weak opinions are influenced by frames
based on peripheral cues such as source. In addition, I want to see if the degree of the
framing effect is related to initial strength of opinion and framing environment.
Chapter VI concludes the study by reviewing the major findings of the research.
Implications of the findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.
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Chapter II
Literature Review
Introduction
There have been three generations of work devoted to examining the influence of
mass communication on public opinion. The first generation of work asserts that elites
utilize mass communication to manipulate citizens’ opinion. These models progressed
from those that posited a simple and direct relationship between mass communication and
citizen opinion in the 1920s and ‘30s (e.g., first generation) to more complex models in
the second generation that took into account the possibility that people’s informational
networks might reinforce pre-existing beliefs thus mitigating the effects of mass
communication (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Those in the third generation
rejected the earlier sentiments of second generation scholars arguing that mass
communication has a more robust impact on public opinion. Mass media has strong
long-term effects on popular opinion based on the stream of messages presented to
audiences. Elite communication has a sizeable influence on citizen opinion because
citizens rely on elite advice to help them make better decisions (Downs 1957; Kinder
1998; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Page and Shapiro
1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). This particular generation gave birth to
three models of mass communication: agenda setting in the 1970s and framing and
priming in the 1980s.
The focus of this dissertation will be on the process of frame setting and
individual level framing effects. The idea of frame setting has been compared to agenda
setting (McCombs and Shaw 1972). According to this perspective, agenda setting deals
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with the accessibility of issues whereas frame setting deals with the accessibility of issue
attributes. Accessibility refers to the ease in which particular instances or associations
can be brought to mind (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). Issues themselves can consist of
attributes which can be employed to think about the issue. Agenda setting deals with the
importance of issues, whereas attribute agenda setting is concerned with issue attributes
and has been categorized as “second level agenda setting” (Weaver et al. 1981).
However, empirical work conducted by Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) and Nelson
and Kinder (1996) contradicted theoretical approaches adopted by McCombs and Shaw
(1993) and McCombs (1997). Nelson and his colleagues did not reject the role of
accessibility in the framing process, but rather argued that the perceived importance of
frames rather than their accessibility is the key variable (Chong 1996; Druckman 2001b;
Jones 1994; Nelson and Kinder 1991, 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Nelson,
Willey, and Oxley 1998). Frames influence opinions because they stress specific values,
facts, and other considerations “endowing them with greater relevance to the issue than
they might appear to have under an alternative frame” (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley
1997:569).
Much work needs to be done in addressing the individual level of framing effects.
The interaction between elite frames and audience frames (e.g., individual schemas) has
been hypothesized to motivate behavioral and attitude changes of the constituents (e.g.,
individual level framing effects). These individual level variables, in turn, constitute the
raw ingredients that elites use when constructing their media frames. Most work does not
take into account the mediating effects of audience frames on individual level outcomes.
In the context of information processing, do constituencies adopt elite frames or frames

11

similar to these in processing information? In order to understand the effects of elite
frames on individual level outcomes (e.g., behavioral, attitudinal, cognitive responses),
we have to understand how audience frames mediate such effects. This dissertation will
address how audience frames might mediate such effects. Addressing the issues of frame
setting and individual level framing effects are important because both are inextricably
linked with citizen attitude formation.

And if the frame-setting process reorders

considerations relevant to opinion, then we need to examine the individual level effects of
framing by addressing whether the public adopts elite frames or the degree to which they
use frames similar to these elite frames in their own information processing.
This literature review will discuss works associated with the agenda setting,
priming, and framing literatures. In addition, since preventive war will be utilized as a
template to examine these questions related to framing, I will also discuss the preventive
and preemptive war literatures as well.
Agenda Setting
It is important to make some conceptual distinctions between agenda setting and
other related topics. Agenda-setting can be contrasted with agenda building. Agenda
building is a concept adopted by Cobb and Elder (1972) and refers to the process
involved in the creation of issues (e.g., policy agenda-setting) (Behr and Iyengar 1985;
Funkhouser 1973; Lang and Lang 1981). In contrast to agenda building, public agenda
setting deals with the salience of public issues. There seems to be a dual focus on elite
content and audience participation. The amount of time or space given to certain issues is
measured and this measurement is related to the amount of time that individuals pay to
issues or to their innate importance (Kosicki 1993). It is not necessarily information
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about the issue or issues which has the effect. As Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) note, at
stake is the relative attention given to a certain issue by policymakers, the media, and the
public and not to others. The issue has received a certain amount of processing time and
attention which carries the effect. Issues can be rank ordered and rise or fall on the
agenda and compete with one another for attention over a long period of time. Or main
issues on an elite agenda can be investigated at a single point in time. Based on these
perspectives, the public agenda is a zero sum game. There is competition associated with
the agenda amongst a very small number of issue proponents. At most, there are usually
only four to five issues on the public agenda at any given time (Brosius and Kepplinger
1992). Kim, Scheufele, and Shanahan (2002) also note that agenda setting needs to be
distinguished from attribute agenda setting.
According to Dearing and Rogers (1996) there are three major sub-areas
associated with agenda setting: policy agenda, public agenda, and media agenda. There
is considerable overlap associated with these sub-areas. The first policy sub-area relates
to policy agenda-setting issues. In this context, the dependent variables of interest are the
issue agendas of public bodies or elected officials. The important items of interest
concern what issues reach the elite agenda. As Dearing and Rogers (1996) point out, a
number of deductive typologies have been proposed concerning issues which might be
placed on the agenda. Lowi (1964) distinguishes between distributive issues which do
not involve an excess of expenditures associated with public funds and thus not much
interest from public groups; regulatory issues which focus on the allocation of contested
public funds and result in interest from combative interest groups; and redistributive
issues, which motivate political leaders to siphon public funding in diverse ways to pacify
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attentive public groups. Rosenau (1971) proposed a division of issues based on the status
of each particular issue, the extent to which human and nonhuman resources are required
on each issue, the territory affected, and the extent to which the means and ends of issue
resolution are tangible. Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969), on the other hand,
considered issues to be military-security, economic, or cultural in nature while Mansbach
and Vasquez (1981) propose a model of how and why issues are placed on the global
policy agenda by focusing on issue proponents, issue salience, what is at stake, the nature
of the stake, and the values that are associated with the stakes at hand.
Despite the issue typologies that have been developed for international relations
studies (Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein 1969; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981) that can be
applied to agenda setting research, Wood and Peake (1998) suggest theoretical and
empirical works in the policy agenda setting literature have largely ignored foreign policy
related matters and instead have focused on understanding how domestic issues reach the
systemic or institutional agenda of the United States (Anderson 1978; Baumgartner and
Jones 1993; Bosso 1987; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Cobb and Elder 1972; Cohen
1995; Downs 1972; Flemming, Wood and Bohte 1995; Glick 1992; Jones 1977, 1994;
Kingdon 1984; Light 1991; Peters and Hogwood 1985). These empirical studies were
largely inspired by March and Olsen (1976) who argue that the core dynamic of policy
agenda setting is attention. Fluctuations in attention are deemed to alter policymaking
routines by destabilizing policy systems. According to March and Olsen (1976), shifts in
attention towards issues are able to disrupt policy subsystems because they are able to
make the public more aware and concerned about particular problems and thus lead to a
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broader participation in the policy process through the expansion of the scope of conflict
(Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1995; Schattsneider 1960).
Wood and Peake (1998) would suggest that the neglect of foreign policy is
derived from practical academic concerns related to shifts in attention towards issues and
the nature of the domestic policy agenda. Theories related to subsystems cannot be easily
applied to foreign policy concerns because foreign policy issues rarely, if ever, generate
the material benefits necessary to encourage interest group participation (Ripley and
Franklin 1991). Pluralism and interest group formation, as a result, are considered to be
of low importance in foreign policy matters (Wood and Peake 1998). In addition, the
domestic policy agenda is developed in gradual, piecemeal fashion with the process aided
by the abilities of domestic interest groups (Anderson 1978; Cobb and Elder 1972;
Kingdon 1984). Thus destabilization of policymaking subsystems is a slow process.
Foreign policy issues, however, evolve as Wood and Peake (1998) suggest based on
crisis developments which may be sporadic and episodic in nature.
Since foreign policy issues sometimes evolve based on external or trigger events
inherited from previous administrations, the president’s ability to set the agenda has been
described as endogenous in nature (Cobb and Elder 1972). The president’s ability to
focus on particular foreign policy crises is constrained by the responsibilities he is
believed to possess. Despite the growth of institutions which exist, the president is
boundedly rational (Simon 1947).

It is impossible for presidents to either forecast the

rise of foreign policy issues or attend to all the issues that develop. The economy of
attention associated with the president’s position is influenced by the priority that the
president gives to some issues in comparison to others (Cobb and Elder 1972). The
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president’s agenda determines which issues are deemed worthy of attention and which
issues are not. The most important foreign policy issues take time and energy to resolve
and require that the president cater to his domestic constituents in the process.
The second sub-area traces its seminal origins to McCombs and Shaw (1972) and
the focus of this work is on public agenda setting. This particular area of research is
related to the literature on bandwagon effects (O’Gorman 1975) which focuses on the
relationship between elite knowledge of public opinion and subsequent influence that
other individuals have towards that opinion. The public agenda setting literature is also
related to the social movement literature (Blumer 1971; Gamson 1992) which focuses on
the collective actions of people to solutions involving the emergence of social problems.
The public agenda setting literature, mostly conducted by mass communication scholars,
suggests that there has to be a relationship between the agenda that elites set and the
agenda which the audience is believed to adopt (Dearing and Rogers 1996). Elites
engage in agenda setting when they shape public opinion by telling citizens what issues
are important and what issues to think about (Cohen 1963; Edelstein 1993; Kingdon
1984). Elite emphasis, for example, on national security threats may lead citizens to
view security threats as an important issue in comparison to health care issues. In order
to prove such a relationship, Kosicki (1993) notes that researchers should present
evidence that the media content is the purported cause of the effects being considered.
Second, it is important that the audience is exposed to such content. Third, other
extraneous factors should be controlled for in order to ensure that the agenda-setting
stimulus is robust and finally, researchers should specify the mechanisms underlying such
effects.
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Dearing and Rogers (1996) note that public agenda-setting studies can be divided
based on the methodological approaches they have used. Two types have been
incorporated. The first kind perceives the public agenda as a hierarchy (McCombs and
Shaw 1972). In this context, all of the main issues on the public agenda at a given point
in time are examined. The second kind perceives the public agenda in longitudinal
fashion in which the rise and fall of one or a few issues at a time is examined (Blumer
1971). One of the key working assumptions of the hierarchical approach is that elite
emphasis on issues helps to determine which issues the members of the public think are
important. The approach suggests that the public is relatively passive in nature (Weaver
1977). However, other research violates these tenets by emphasizing that the public is
relatively engaged in public issues (Downs 1972; Gamson 1992; Kingdon 1984).
Hierarchy studies, however, do not adequately capture this relationship since
longitudinal based designs are better able to capture how public opinion exerts influence
on policymakers or how issues rise or fall at the expense of other issues on the public
agenda (Zhu 1992). Downs (1972) suggests that a longitudinal approach is most
appropriate for an agenda-setting approach because the issue-attention cycle proceeds
through clearly identifiable stages. An undesirable situation exists but may not capture
public attention. Then a dramatic event suddenly erupts on the scene and creates public
alarm concerning the issue. The cost of solving the social problem might be seen as too
expensive and thus might begin to slip down the public agenda as interest fades in the
issue. There might be a high cost associated with solving the social problem and the
media or elite coverage of the issue might create boredom associated with the issue.
Afterwards the issue drops off the public agenda. Or perhaps, as Dearing and Rogers
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(1996) point out, the media’s focus on a particular issue might have the opposite effect.
The media or elite agenda might influence the public agenda for an issue based on a
gradual and incremental process. As the cumulative number of messages builds up and
increases over time, the public may become persuaded that the issue is important. Hence,
the public agenda for an issue might actually be emboldened in longitudinal fashion.
Based on research conducted of the public agenda from a hierarchical and
longitudinal perspective, foreign affairs issues have generally dominated the public
agenda of the US public since World War II, between 40% to 50% of the MIP (e.g., most
important problem) responses by the public from 1946 to 1976 (Smith 1980). One of the
primary questions raised by public agenda-setting studies pertains to whether the
executive is a proactive or reactive office (Andrade and Young 1996; Peake 2001). In the
context of foreign policy crises, the executive is viewed by some as the dominant player
because such an institution has advantages in key areas such as secrecy, efficiency, and
unity that the legislative branch does not possess (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cohen
1995; Edwards and Barrett 2000; Kingdon 1984; Jones 1994; Neustadt 1960; Peterson
1994). Sinclair (1993) argues that even though congressional leaders have become more
active in foreign and defense policy since the Vietnam War, their influence is still limited
(see however Carter 1998; Carter, Scott, and Rowling 2004; Lindsay 1994; Scott and
Carter 2002).
Despite such limited influence, Congress is comprised of individual players who
differ in terms of policy interests. Labeled policy entrepreneurs by Carter, Scott, and
Rowling (2004), certain individuals may wish to affect policy, whether in support or
opposition. These individuals seek to initiate action on foreign policy actions they deeply
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care about rather than simply wait for administration action. As Carter, Scott, and
Rowling note, members of Congress have an incentive to act as foreign policy
entrepreneurs if members of the administration do not initiate policies on foreign policy
interests of deep concern. The second cause, the authors note, is to initiate a change in
administration policy that is of particular dislike to a member of Congress. Such interests
may be a byproduct of formative experiences or exogenously driven by constituency
needs. However, arguably as the dominant player in the foreign policy process, the
president has a number of tools at his disposal that are believed to assist him in the public
agenda setting process. Presidents routinely hold news conferences (Eshbaugh-Soha
2003; Hager and Sullivan 1994), travel abroad and domestically (Brace and Hinckley
1992), and make policy statements to affect the coverage they receive.
In addition to holding news conferences and formulating policy statements, the
president is uniquely situated to influence the public agenda because of his position and
control over the U.S. military. Because the president has authority to order military
actions, he has the ability to shift public and governmental attention to issues he
considers to be extremely important, which can provide public and congressional political
support for his actions especially if the focus is narrow (Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha
2007; Edwards and Wood 1999; Peake 2001; Schattsneider 1960). Besides possessing
the power to initiate military actions, public support can be further cemented through the
president's State of the Union addresses (Gruscynski 2004). Cohen (1995) and Hill
(1998) found that presidential agenda setting is most pronounced after the State of the
Union address (see however Young and Perkins 2005). In comparison to the State of the
Union speech, the president's ability to set the agenda declines with other presidential
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speeches not given in front of a national audience (Edwards and Wood 1999; Wood and
Peake 1998).
Some studies, therefore, assert that the executive is a reactive rather than a
proactive office (Baum and Kernell 1999; Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards 2003;
Wood and Peake 1998). As Gruscyznski (2007) notes, the nature of the constraints
associated with the presidency suggest that we should study the powers that the president
has in the context of the entire system that surrounds each presidency. It is important,
therefore, as Gruscyznski (2007) points out, that there are a number of factors outside of
the president’s direct control (e.g., constitutional limitations, formal and informal
arrangements amongst institutions, and changing conditions in the policymaking
environment). Factors which might help the president to set his agenda such as his
approval ratings, his influence in Congress, and international events are only partially
influenced by the president. Furthermore, the executive is highly responsive to media
coverage (Peake 2001). Those studies that see the president’s office as reactive in nature
generally view the president’s ability to set the agenda as a dependent variable developed
through external factors such as attention paid to it by Congress and public opinion.
Approval ratings are dependent on prior economic conditions that are associated with the
presidency at a given point in time (Brace and Hinckley 1992). In addition, as Bond and
Fleisher (1990) assert, the president’s influence in Congress which might help to set his
agenda is determined by and large through the parties that are composing the members of
both houses (e.g., whether the government is divided or not). Moreover, he has to
compete for air-time with entertainment choices on TV (Edwards and Eshbaugh-Soha
2001).
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The influence of the media gives credence to the president’s position as largely
that of a reactive rather than proactive office.

The media-agenda setting literature

largely assumes that the agenda-setting process begins with the issue climbing on the
media agenda (Dearing and Rogers 1996). The media in essence determines the public
agenda of elites. Of course such determination is based on the credibility of the source.
The New York Times is a more credible source than the National Enquirer and therefore
would have more agenda setting power. In addition, the media has agenda-setting power
based on the amount of interpersonal conversation which takes place amongst the public
that may reinforce media talking points (Wanta and Wu 1992).
The media also may play a significant role based on a need for orientation on
behalf of the constituents. Individuals with high uncertainty will have a high need to
become oriented towards an issue. These individuals will seek out information from
media outlets to reduce their uncertainty thus leading to greater agenda-setting effects
(Weaver, McCombs, and Spellman 1975). As a result of this need to reduce uncertainty,
it should not be surprising that an individual’s close familiarity with a particular issue
may override the influence of the mass media in helping to determine what is important
for the person. For example, as Dearing and Rogers (1996) suggest, depending on how
individuals hear about information concerning events like the U.S. military presence in
Somalia (e.g., mass media, interpersonal conversations with others) will help to
determine the agenda-setting power of the media. Individuals, because they are more
likely to be uninformed about international issues than domestic, will rely more on the
mass media to help establish what is important from what is not important (Manheim
1986).

However, scholars such as Iyengar and Kinder (1987) found that personal
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experience with an issue might sensitize an individual to that issue, so that further
information is then sought in the media concerning that issue. Hence, there is a positive
correlation between personal experience with an issue and the enhancement of the media
agenda’s influence.
The media can increase or decrease the accessibility of an issue based on the type
or amount of coverage provided (Mullins 1977; Shaw and Clemmer 1977; Wanta and Hu
1994). As Linsky (1986) notes, the media is important because government officials and
politicians take the amount of media attention present on an issue as an indirect
expression of public interest on that particular issue. Wittkopf (1990) asserts that many
Americans do not pay a great deal of attention to an issue until events covered by the
media motivate them to do so. Oftentimes, however, the attention is slight and has a
tendency to lessen in intensity rather quickly.

Of course the president wishes to

manipulate the press by informing the media of matters that are of high importance to his
administration through presidential trips, summits and speeches (Brace and Hinckley
1992). Many politicians and bureaucrats learn of each other’s activities through the
efforts of the mass media. Policymakers, according to Linsky (1986), attempt to acquire
positive coverage for their issues while tipping off reporters about the negative aspects of
competing issues. So, as a result, policymakers and elites will naturally try to further
their own policy goals.
Taking into consideration that there have been different findings associated with
examining the executive office as either proactive or reactive in nature, it is important to
examine the circumstances in which the executive is constituted as either proactive or
reactive in nature. Scholars have tackled the divide in the reactive/proactive debate by
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considering prior issue importance.

Prior issue importance, as Edwards and Wood

(1999), Flemming, Wood, and Bohte (1995) suggest, may be vital in determining the
agenda-setting power of the president. Depending on the policy issue presented, the
president may either be a strong agenda setter or a weak agenda setter. The policy issue
itself resembles that of a conditional variable. If the policy issue is new or weak, the
president faces relatively few constraints in determining how that issue might fit into his
agenda since competing actors have very little interest in such an issue when it is weak or
may not have an established position on it if the issue is new. However, if the issue is old
or strong, the president has to compete with other actors in establishing his agenda.
Wood and Peake (1998), for example, have found evidence suggesting that the president
is a weak agenda setter in comparison to the media when salient topics such as the ArabIsraeli conflict were the subject matter than when non-salient topics such as health care
(Edwards and Wood 1999) or foreign aid are the topics of concern (Peake 2001).
Priming
The literature suggests that priming takes place when elites tell citizens how to
think about politicians and issues (Dearing and Rodgers 1996). Citizens are primed, for
example, when they evaluate political leaders on the basis of their national security
policies. Priming occurs when elite emphasis on an issue induces citizens to base their
political judgments on that particular issue (Ghanem 1997; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).
Specific issues should be used as benchmarks to evaluate the performance of leaders and
government. Priming is believed to be related to agenda-setting. The elite agenda is said
to influence the public’s agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

By encouraging the

formation of public opinion through telling individuals what to think about,
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considerations can be shaped that are taken into account when making judgments about
candidates or issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).
Priming influences constituent attention by calling attention to some specific
issues and ignoring other issues. Priming thus helps to activate remembered associations
and influence the considerations that individuals might use in forming their political
opinions (Jones 1994). As Fiske and Taylor (1991) note, priming works by helping
individuals take into account context in the interpretation of new information which
differentiates priming from other phenomena such as framing. When people are primed
by television news stories about national defense, people judge elites such as the
president by how well they provide national defense. Recently and frequently activated
ideas come to mind more readily than ideas that are not in the process of being activated.
Accessibility, as is the case for agenda setting, is viewed as the key mediator of priming
effects (Higgins and King 1981; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Brannon 1993;
Miller and Krosnick 1996; Price and Tewksbury 1997; Wyer and Srull 1986, 1989). The
concept’s accessibility is determined in part by the frequency (Higgins, Bargh, and
Lombardi 1985) and recency (Herr, Sherman, and Fazio 1983; Higgins, Rholes, and
Jones 1977; Srull and Wyer 1980) in which it has been used in the past, and how readily
such a concept can be retrieved from memory. Thus chronic accessibility of a concept
such as the president’s foreign policy will be much greater for individuals who have been
exposed to news stories like this in the past. Stimuli motivate priming by influencing the
individual’s ability to judge and evaluate.
How does priming operate based on accessibility? Priming has been known to
operate through mass media effects because most individuals are dependent on the mass
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media concerning international affairs (Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat 2003). Exposure to
news coverage increases knowledge and therefore accessibility in association with such
events (Albritton and Manheim 1983; Manheim and Albritton 1984; Perry 1985, 1987).
These events may involve issues such as the nature of personal interactions amongst
people of different nations to mass attitudes about foreign policy and the practice of
diplomacy (Bartels 1995; Brewer, Graf and Wilnat 2003; Manheim 1991, 1994; Peffley
and Hurwitz 1992).
Studies conducted by Iyengar et al. (1984) along with Iyengar and Kinder (1987)
illustrate the importance of accessibility in relationship to news stories. The studies
conducted by Iyengar and his colleagues are influential because they break ground
methodologically in examining the agenda-setting and priming process. Most research
examining these effects utilizes survey-content analysis based methods. However,
Iyengar and his colleagues disaggregated agenda-setting research probing the psychology
of the agenda-setting process by examining these issues from a micro-level perspective.
Iyengar et al. (1984) randomly assigned subjects to watch either a news broadcast
containing several stories on defense or a broadcast which contained no stories on
defense related issues. After viewing one of the two broadcasts, subjects were then asked
to rate the president’s overall performance in a number of specific areas, in particular
energy, economic, and defense policy. Subjects who viewed broadcasts emphasizing
defense policy placed a greater salience concerning the president’s performance on
defense policy than did subjects who saw absolutely no stories focusing on defense.
Hence, news stories served to prime opinions towards the president’s performance on
defense policy. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) further demonstrated that news coverage of a
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particular issue is able not only to increase salience, but also to prime viewers to give that
particular issue more weight in their overall evaluation of public officials and political
candidates. Exposure to media coverage of national problems such as energy, defense,
and inflation increased the salience that Americans assigned to Jimmy Carter’s
performance on these particular issues in regards to forming an opinion concerning his
performance. Field studies have also studied this phenomenon as well. Krosnick and
Kinder (1990) examined the effects of media coverage on the Iran-Contra scandal on
perceptions of President Reagan in 1986. The disclosure of the Iran-Contra scandal took
place in the midst of the National Election Study (NES) survey and the authors thus
compared two groups of people, one that was interviewed before the disclosure and one
that was interviewed after the disclosure. Respondents in the post-disclosure group lent
more weight to foreign policy in their evaluation of President Reagan’s decision than did
the pre-disclosure group. However, what priming cannot tell us is whether people lent
more weight to foreign policy based on the type of news coverage associated with the
Iran-Contra scandal. We could argue that people lent weight to foreign policy because of
the negative publicity associated with the scandal, which might be independent of the
quantity of news coverage associated with the issue.
Two models have been developed to address priming as it relates to these
particular works. First, it is possible to think of priming in terms of an associative
network model. Individual memory consists of organized nodes that are linked together
through various associative pathways (Anderson and Bowers 1973; Collins and Loftus
1975). Once one node is activated, this activation then spreads to other nodes that are
present in the mental network.

Domke, Shah, and Wackman (1998) suggest that
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activation may spread from one political concept to another which can thus activate
indirectly associated concepts. This associative network model of information processing
is based on the idea of accessibility because judgments and attitude formation have been
found to be correlated based on the ease with which these associations come to mind
(Collins and Loftus 1975; Kahneman and Tversky 1973). According to this approach,
individuals make judgments about other people or issues based on information that can
be easily retrieved through memory. The longer the time that it takes for respondents to
answer a question, for example, the less accessible is the association. Priming works
through accessibility (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Chong 1993; Domke, Shah, and
Wackman 1998; Fazio 1995; Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989; Hothchild 1983;
Iyengar 1991; Nabi 2003). As Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat (2003) suggest, a story about
domestic terrorism may prime the issue of terrorism which can thus influence the
attitudes towards foreign nations previously associated with terrorism. However, what is
important to note is that the issues that are the most accessible in a person’s memory are
most likely to strongly influence the individual.
The second model that has been developed to compete with the associative
network model is called the “online” processing model. Wilnat (1997) labels this model
a “storage bin model.”

Attitudes are formed as incoming information is processed

(Hastie and Park 1986). Attitudes are stored in memory in what has been called summary
or judgment tallies (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). New impressions are processed
and integrated into a running tally that then shapes one’s attitude (Torgenthau and
Rasinski 1988). Attitudes may change, but the argument which motivated the change in
attitude is forgotten.
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In both models, there is a potential for ambiguity in the linkages between the issue
and target of judgment. It is possible for citizens to draw multiple connections between
one concept and another concept. News stories might activate contradictory associations
and as a result, fail to guide the judgment of citizens in a particular direction. For
example, as Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat (2003) note, Americans might be able to draw a
negative association between the “war on drugs” and Mexico and Columbia with the
thought that these particular nations are prominent sources of illegal drugs that might
reach the US. However, the individual may also develop a positive association between
the “war on drugs” and Mexico and Columbia because these countries are perceived to be
key US allies in that war also.
Framing
The framing process is believed to involve both frame-building and frame-setting
processes (Kanner 2004). The frame-building process is a rather under-theorized
research topic. Frame building refers to processes associated with how elite frames are
formed or types of frames created. Based on research conducted by Shoemaker and
Reese (1996) and Tuchman (1978), five factors have been identified as playing a role in
the frame-building process: social norms and values, organizational pressures and
constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political
orientations of journalists. Entman (2004) proposed a media effects framing model which
argues that on foreign policy issues, frames that originate from the administration shape
the frames used by other elites (e.g., members of Congress), media outlets and the public.
Entman’s model suggests that ideas cascade downward from the administration’s first
expressions concerning an event. These expressions lead to discussions between elites
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who comprise Congressional members and staffers as well as important foreign policy
leaders. The ideas circulated amongst the president’s administration and elites cascades
downward to the media. These individuals communicate regularly with individuals from
the president’s administration as well as elites. The interaction between the media, elites,
and members of the president’s administration helps to generate media frames which are
then disseminated to the public. The public’s reaction to the media frames feeds back to
the media and other elites who then influence the administration’s views. This process is
believed to determine the debate on a particular issue, for example, whether one frame
dominates in the debate or if there is parity amongst a multitude of frames.
In the prospect theory literature, there is an effort to distinguish between two
phases in the choice process. The first phase constitutes the frame-building phase. The
first phase, the editing phase, incorporates a very simple preliminary analysis of the
choice problem. As Levy (1997) notes, the editing and production of frames plays a
much greater role in choice situations in international relations than does the evaluating
process. The process is important because the process transforms the representation of
outcomes and probabilities. However, according to Levy (1994), the editing processes
associated with prospect theory remain underdeveloped. Such an analysis, however, is
believed to include an identification of options available to the actors, the possible
outcomes associated with each of the choices, and the values and probabilities associated
with each of the various outcomes. Involved in this process are several mental operations
involving coding, simplification, the elimination of dominated alternatives and
probabilities associated with outcomes (Levy 1994). Coding involves the identification
of a reference point and framing of outcomes as deviations from this reference point.
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This process can affect individual orientations towards risk. Simplification incorporates
the rounding off of probabilities or outcomes which includes the discarding of unlikely
outcomes. In addition, dominated alternatives are eliminated and probabilities associated
with identical outcomes are combined.
Most of the literature, however, in international relations focuses on the framesetting process. Framing, in this context, refers simply to the phenomenon that subtle
changes in the wording or description of a situation might affect how audience members
interpret a given situation. For those who want to conceptually distinguish framing from
priming, framing takes into account that the subtle selection of certain aspects of a given
issue by the media or elites makes these aspects more important than other aspects.
Framing is utilized, therefore, to simplify complex issues. How an issue is characterized
relates to how well it is understood. Framing traces its roots to sociology (Goffman
1974; Pan and Kosicki 1993) and psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

Priming,

on the other hand, takes place when elite emphasis on an issue encourages individuals to
think of that issue in a certain way. Priming effects also rely on context as they interact
with the interpretation and retrieval of information. Context helps to establish issue
salience and therefore accessibility. Framing effects do not necessarily have to take into
account context. In addition, framing has been distinguished from agenda setting based
on the locus of effect. An agenda-setting effect takes place based on the processing time
associated with the particular issue. In contrast, a framing effect takes place based on
how the issue is described (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).
Elite frames have been referred to in two ways. First, framing has referred to the
words, images, phrases, presentation styles that a speaker may use when relaying
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information to another individual in order to manipulate or influence opinion (Cappella
and Jamieson 1997; Entman 1993). Nelson and Kinder (1996) and Entman (1993)
stipulate that frames are simply more than positions or arguments about an issue. Frames
illustrate the essence of the problem and, by doing so suggest how the problem should be
thought about as well as in what manner the problem should be solved. Moreover, the
chosen frame reveals what the speaker sees as relevant to the topic at hand. For example,
President Bush issued a “frame” by suggesting that there was a need to go to war with
Iraq due to the threat Iraq posed to US national interests. In issuing this frame, the
president suggested how the crisis should be thought about and in addition, made
recommendations concerning what should be done to solve the crisis. An emphasis
framing effect is said to take place. An emphasis or issue framing effect is said to occur
in political discourse when in the process of describing an event, a speaker’s emphasis on
a subset of potentially viable considerations encourages individuals to focus on these
particular considerations in the process of constructing overall opinion (Druckman
2001b).
In this context, political elites choose to frame events strategically. Riker (1993)
argues that political elites choose frames that emphasize issues in which they have an
advantage relative to other elites and avoid issues in which either the other side or no
particular side has a particular advantage (Austen-Smith 1993; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994).
As Entman (2004) notes, frames chosen by the executive have a tendency to shape
opinion developed by congressional leaders and members of the media elite. Public
feedback influences how the media re-frames the issue for members of the executive.
Thus, when political elites choose frames, they have to take into account that there are
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many actors who might attempt to frame and re-frame these issues. The production side
of the framing equation helps to determine if there is one frame amongst an issue or
whether competing frames of equal or unequal salience dominate the issue. In addition,
members of a decision unit have to be careful concerning which words, images, phrases,
or presentation styles come to mind when framing policy options for an elite decisionmaker (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993; Geva, Mayhar, and Skorick 2000; Geva, Mintz,
and Redd 2000; Maoz 1990; Mintz 1993; Mintz and Geva 1997; Redd and Geva 2001;
Redd 2002).
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), Boettcher (2004), and Krosnick (1988) note that
packets of incoming information pass through cognitive, affective, and/or social filters
that help to create perceptions of the outside world. The external environment is both
ambiguous and expansive. Individuals possess limited cognitive capacities and therefore
must restrict their inputs to the few most salient dimensions in order to reach some form
of closure. Because individuals have limited cognitive capacity, it is possible they might
have vague notions on many political topics and thus may not have fully developed
attitudes. At best, individuals might be able to express few considerations that come to
mind in response to questions but not be able to identify their importance. Thus the set of
dimensions along which a person’s evaluations are based might be limited.

Hence

politicians, when they attempt to select themes have to keep in mind the considerations
that their constituents possess. So when we consider the words, image, styles, etc., that
an individual may use in the context of framing, we should also examine literature which
has focused on works emphasizing thematic, productive, initiator v. target, and revolving
versus sequential types of framing.
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When we think of thematic framing, we think of attempts by leaders and actors to
insert themes into the policy debate. Themes refer to information presented by leaders
emphasizing different attributes of an issue (Druckman 2004a; Nelson, Clawson, and
Oxley 1997). Hence, thematic frames rely on content-based communication to get their
message across. The frame contains content which acts as a focal point in which citizens
can be sensitized to specific elements of the political environment (Geva, Courtois, and
Mintz 1996). Thematic frames help to prioritize the content that is being considered
during policy debates (Geva, Courtois and Mintz 1996). In this context, as Berinsky and
Kinder (2006) note, elites introduce frames in such a way that the public is able to
comprehend and understand them. Riker (1986, 1993) also notes that political elites
often choose frames that emphasize issues on which they have an advantage relative to
other opponents and also avoid issues in which the other side or even no side is believed
to have an advantage. If elites are able to define the boundaries of an issue along which it
is discussed, specifically in terms of what the public considers to be domestically
acceptable, then it would be easier for members of the public to lend their support
(Astorino-Courtois 1996; Geva, Courtois and Mintz 1996; Paine 1989; Riker 1986;
Schattsneider 1960).
The purpose of choosing proper words, images, phrases, and presentation styles is
to engage ultimately in productive framing. Productive framing, quite simply is any
framing attempt that tends to bring about the desired outcome. If a leader, for example,
decides to portray a potential adversary in a negative light and the intended audience of
the frame is a domestic public, then if the public does view the potential adversary in
negative fashion, it can be argued that the frame was productive. If the frame produces
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something other than the intended consequences, then the frame itself is said to be
counterproductive or a failed frame (Mintz and Redd 2003).
Important factors that might condition frame success are moderator variables.
Individuals, as Gross (2000) points out, are less receptive to frames that might contradict
their values.

Strong predispositions to certain frames have been shown to increase

resistance to disconfirming information. Druckman and Nelson (2003) have shown that
knowledge enhances framing effects since it increases the likelihood that considerations
emphasized in a particular frame might be available or understood by the individual.
Moderators have been shown to influence framing effects based on their influence on the
strength of the frame. Frames delivered by credible sources are likely to influence
framing effects whereas frames delivered by non-credible sources are not (Druckman
2001c). Frames that invoke cultural values are also likely to influence framing effects
(Chong 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1987).
A frame can be successful also depending on the strategies or tactics used in the
framing attempt. Productive framing attempts may be derived from who is doing the
framing and/or who is being framed. In turn, these chosen strategies and tactics may also
depend on the issue at stake and the target of the frame, for example whether a target
state is democratic or authoritarian. Presidents of democratic states are more likely to
succeed in negatively framing the actions and leaders of non-democratic states and thus
obtain public approval for the use of force against such entities than if they were to
engage in similar activities towards democratic actors (Mintz and Geva 1993). As Geva,
Mintz and True (1994) demonstrated, subjects were less supportive of the use of force
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when the adversary was framed as democratic in nature than if the adversary was framed
as non-democratic in nature.
Whether a frame is deemed to be successful might be dependent on whether the
frame is presented in revolving or sequential fashion. A revolving frame encompasses a
series of different frames sequentially implemented over time.

A sequential frame

utilizes the same frame with the notion that various aspects of it are implemented over
time. As Maoz (1990) notes, sequential framing is related to the salami tactic. Individual
leaders are posited to break a course of action into a series of gradual policy options.
Each subsequent change in policy options deviates marginally from the previous stage
and also helps to set the stage for future frames to be implemented as well. Frames might
be implemented either before or after the decision is made to engage in a use of force. In
the case of the Persian Gulf Crisis, framing occurred before the use of force was
implemented and in the cases of Grenada, Libya, and Panama, framing took place after
the use of force was implemented (Geva, Mintz and True 1994).
In addition to the timing of the frame, individuals can frame aggregate effects or
multiple options (Levy 1996). Levy notes that framing oftentimes focuses on only single,
one-shot outcomes or events and thus overlooks the cases in which crucial choices are
made involving compound outcomes.

How leaders aggregate or disaggregate these

outcomes may influence the reference point used in establishing what is a loss or gain.
The second kind of framing, classified as evaluative in nature, refers to the
speaker’s frame of a situation which can alter another’s understanding of that particular
situation (Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat 2003; Hoyt and Garrison 1997; Maoz 1990; TaylorRobinson and Redd 2003). The frame manipulates the reference point to which the
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external environment is compared with (Mintz and Redd 2003). The frame serves to
operate as an evaluative anchor in the assessment of the environment, and is therefore
able to shift the meaning of the policy debate (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Quattrone
and Tversky 1988). An evaluative frame, for example, might skew perceptions of a
peace operation as either more favorable or less favorable than the objective situation
deserves (Geva, Courtois, and Mintz 1996).
The preeminent framing theory in International Relations which takes into
account the nature of evaluative frames is prospect theory (Levy 1992). Prospect theory
relies heavily on what are called valence-based framing effects. An equivalency, or
valence based framing effect is said to occur when two logically equivalent statements of
a problem that are not necessarily transparent in equivalency lead individual decision
makers to select different options (Boettcher 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1979;
McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman
1981, 1986). Scholars have used prospect theory to call into question the basic economic
premise that individuals are believed to have stable, asymmetric and transitive
preferences. Prospect theory thus attempts to incorporate observed violations of expected
utility theory and derive from these a theory of risky choice that is based on experimental
findings in conjunction with mathematical formulas which provide the necessary
explanatory and predictive frameworks.
In prospect theory, edited prospects are evaluated and the preferred prospect is
selected. People tend to think in terms of gains and losses in the context of a reference
point rather than in terms of their net assets. They encode the choices they make in terms
of deviations from a reference point. The reference point is usually deemed to be the
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status quo. People have a tendency to remain at the status quo and hence it is the most
common reference point for states as well as for individuals when they frame a decision
problem (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). The bias towards the status quo is believed
to lead to the loss-aversion effect. However, the status quo does not have to serve as a
reference point. A future aspiration level can be a reference point as well.
Due to the encoding process related to the reference point and the differential
treatment of gains and losses, the identification of the reference point, or framing of the
choice problems is a matter of critical importance (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
People tend to treat gains differently from losses in relationship to the reference point.
The value function associated with prospect theory is deemed to be concave for gains and
convex for losses. Thus, individuals are deemed to be risk averse in the domain of gain
and risk seeking in the domain of loss (Dawes 1988). These observations have been
substantiated by past work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) who have found that when individuals are faced with a
choice between risky prospects (a sure gain of $100 in comparison to a 50% chance of
receiving $200 or 50% chance of receiving nothing), they are more likely to use riskaverse strategies when the outcomes are framed as gains and risk-seeking strategies when
the equivalent outcomes are framed in terms of losses. Individual preferences change as
a result of the alternative frames even though the objective outcomes are deemed to be
identical. These findings have been demonstrated in a variety of settings in the
international arena (Astorino-Courois 1996; Boettcher 1995; Farnham 1992; Geva,
Astorino-Courtois, and Mintz 1996; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992; Jervis 1992;

37

Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Levy 1987, 1992, 1996; McDermott 1992, 1998; Stein
1993).
In addition, negative items are weighted more heavily psychologically than
positive items. Losses hurt more than equal gains. An event that is framed as averting a
loss or securing a gain may have substantial repercussions in arms control negotiations as
well as in escalating commitments.

The weapons one side may give up will be

experienced as more of a loss than those that could be gained through the dismantling of
the other side. The concessions that one makes count more psychologically than the
concessions the other side might make. Concessions and acceptable agreements can be
difficult, since the principle of loss aversion indicates that both sides want the other side
to give up more weapons than they themselves are willing to give up. Loss aversion
helps to explain sunk costs. People appear to be willing to pay additional costs in order
to recover sunk costs. As Schaubroeck and Davis (1994) and Straw (1976) showed,
individuals who are not responsible for an original policy that failed might be more
willing to stop the policy as opposed to putting further resources into continuing that
policy. Applied to international relations, when a situation is framed as involving the
potential battle deaths to be incurred, it is politically difficult for leaders to cut and run
from the situation. Because of this, risks are taken in bad situations (e.g., Vietnam) in the
hopes that in doing so, losses may be recovered, the tide of the battle may be turned, or
sunk costs might be recouped (Arkes and Blumer 1985).
In addition to arms control agreements and escalation-based endeavors,
McDermott (2004) suggests that arguments over territory can become particularly
contentious in the context of loss aversion. For example, in the Middle East today, the
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Israelis assert that they own land in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians, on the
other hand, want to possess such territory and make it their own sovereign and
independent nation. In this context, when land is taken away, it is framed as a loss that
must be overturned and made right. However, when land is gained, it is framed as a
rightful gain. When each side perceives that the same territory is stolen, the possibility
for peace fades into the background. Each side will fight long and hard for the land they
feel was lost or stolen instead of fighting for new land it seeks to control for the very first
time. It is more difficult to achieve a peaceful solution if individuals believe that the land
they claim as their own is possessed by an adversary.
Given these set of circumstances, what is the relationship between framing and
preventive war? Can we frame preventive war in such a way that we can systematically
understand how leaders can gain or lose support for the use of force?
Preventive War
Before we address these questions, it is important to address the differences
associated with preventive wars from warfare in general. In particular, preventive wars
can be distinguished from non-preventive wars by the presence or absence of a power
shift. A power shift, very simply, is defined as a change in relative power capabilities
between two states based on changes in national growth. In order for a war to be
classified as preventive in nature, an actual or perceived power shift has to be a necessary
and/or sufficient condition. It is this power shift that is believed to create perceptions of a
resource deficit thus fueling the preventive motivation. In contrast to preventive wars, in
non-preventive wars, the power shift may be one of many factors we should consider as a
causal variable explaining the outbreak of conflict (Lemke 2003; Levy 1987).
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Normative works address the conditions or circumstances under which it is
permissible to launch preventive war. Thus, works in the normative genre have largely
focused on legal and moral standards associated with the proper use of preventive force
within a just-war context (Crawford 2003; Dombrowski and Payne 2006; Raymond 2007;
Record 2004). As discussed by Buchanan and Keohane (2004), there are four different
perspectives in the normative literature in regards to preventive war. The first, labeled
the just-war blanket prohibition, suggests that preventive war is strictly forbidden
(Kaufman 2005; Walzer 1977). Force might be justified in cases where an attack is
imminent and the enemy is mobilizing forces with clear aggressive intent and/or missiles
or warplanes have been launched but have not reached their intended target. Thus, such a
perspective forbids preventive conflict, though not preemptive conflict. The second
perspective, the legal status-quo, suggests that the preventive use of force is regarded as
prohibited by contemporary international law unless the state has received collective
authorization from the UN Security Council to conduct such war. Since the UN Charter
clearly stipulates that the use of force should be used to defend against armed attack, the
preventive use of force is strictly curtailed. The legal-status quo perspective suggests that
these high constraints should be maintained. The third and fourth perspectives are quite
similar. The third perspective, the national interest perspective, suggests that states may
do whatever their leaders believe necessary to serve the best interests of the state.
Leaders of states may disregard universal moral principles when they conflict with the
national interest. Leaders have the right to use force preventively if they deem it to be
necessary to pursue state interests. And the fourth perspective, adopted as a primary
component of the Bush Doctrine, suggests that preventive war should be used proactively
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as a tool to defend against future losses. If preventive war is used as a proactive tool as
critics fear, then there is the possibility of imperial expansion and overreach as well as the
sensitivity on the part of target nations to such imperial expansion and overreach (Snyder
2003).
The empirical literature focusing on preventive war has largely addressed
concerns associated with the international system. Some scholars have pointed out that
preventive war has been initiated to preserve the balance of power in the international
system (Gulick 1955). However, as Niou and Ordeshook (1987) suggest, leaders not
only calculate the balance of power based on present resources in the international
system, but also the potential for future imbalances as well. These future imbalances
might be derived from resource deficits caused by a declining world power (Gilpin 1975,
1981; Levy 1987). If the balance of power in the system might become "unbalanced" in
the future, then a preventive war might be launched in the present to perhaps rectify the
situation (Brodie 1973; Fay 1966; Maoz 1983). However, as Niou and Ordeshook (1987)
note, if preventive wars can be launched simply to rectify a future balance of power
problem, then there is a possibility that preventive war may involve more than two
adversaries (e.g., a hegemon and challenger nation) and may not be only launched by a
single hegemonic country, but by any country who wants to recalibrate the balance of
power. Preventive war, for example, might be launched by a coalition of countries to
prevent one country from becoming too dominant. Certain coalitions might be more
prone to launching preventive war than others. And even if all countries grow at the
same rate, depending on how this rate of growth influences the future balance of power
between these nations of interest, this might influence whether or not preventive war
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breaks out.

Others such as Organski and Kugler (1980) assert that dissatisfied

challengers have waged wars against great powers long before a balance of power was
substantively achieved (see also Doran and Parsons 1980; Goldstein 1988; Organski
1968).
The empirical literature also suggests that we need to take into consideration the
domestic constraints associated with launching preventive war.

Structural theories

cannot explain why some power shifts lead to preventive war while others do not
(Schweller 1992). Regime type plays a significant intervening factor in determining the
nature of domestic constraints associated with launching preventive war (Dolan 2004;
Holsti 2004; Hymans 2004; Tucker 2004). In democracies there are many players who
are more than able and willing to counterframe bellicose frames by rehashing the costs
associated with going to war (Fischer 2004; Hymans 2004; Tucker 2004).

Intra-

departmental squabbles between hawks and doves may also complicate matters as well.
So taking into account all these constraints, Schweller (1992) asserts that preventive war
should only be an attractive option for declining leaders in non-democratic states (see
also Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). In democracies, leaders will have a hard time
mobilizing forces necessary to engage in preventive conflicts. The separation of civilian
and military power characteristic of democracy discourages preventive warfare (Posen
1984; Schweller 1992).
The politics of a society must comply with the norms of that society as Brodie
(1965) suggests and because of this, preventive war is an attractive response for leaders
facing future resource deficits only in the case of non-democratic regimes. The public is
averse to the costs associated with war. The arguments adapted by Schweller (1992) are
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derived from democratic peace theory which suggests that democracies are by nature
more pacific and less bellicose, all things being equal, than non-democracies (Chan 1997;
Maoz and Russett 1993; Maoz 1998; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Weart 1998). This does
not necessarily mean that democracies are less prone to go to war than non-democracies.
This simply means that there are built-in electoral constraints which suggest that costs be
minimized when initiating conflict. Furthermore, the assumptions adopted by Schweller
(1992) and Posen (1984) fail to take into account the possibility that presidents might be
able to frame such policies in ways that may seem favorable to their constituents and thus
minimize the electoral constraints and costs associated with launching preventive war.
Preemptive War
As Reiter (1995) points out, preemptive war is not motivated by greed as in
preventive war, but by fear. A preemptive war breaks out if an attacker believes that it
will be the target of a military attack in the short term. A preventive war, on the other
hand, breaks out if the attacker believes that it will be victimized in the long-term. A
preventive war is said to take place if the use of force is used to stem an attack that might
take place a few years from now or if the declining power will be in a position of
strategic inferiority in the long-term if it does not launch an attack in the present.
Therefore, most scholars suggest that we can distinguish preventive wars from
preemptive wars based on the time dimension in play (Jervis 1978; Levy 1987; Vagts
1956). Preventive wars take into account a time dimension whereas preemptive wars do
not. For example, Van Evera (1999) defines a war as preemptive if a state is motivated to
attack if there is an advantage to making the first move regardless if the war happens now
or later. Preventive wars, on the other hand, occur if the attacker prefers war now to war
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later regardless of who made the first move. A war is thus preventive according to Van
Evera (1999) if the attacker prefers to attack now rather than face the risk of an attack in
the future if the additional time affords the adversary a relative advantage.

Thus,

according to Van Evera, preventive wars emerge from concerns focused primarily on
long-term shifts in power from wars that emerge from crisis dynamics.
Reiter (1995) notes that there are two models which predict preemption as a
central path to war: a) spiral model, and b) offense-defense balance. Relations between
states according to the spiral model are characterized by spirals of hostility and fear.
Preemptive war is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fear of being a target encourages a state
to lash out and strike. As the dynamics of an international crisis unfold, the end result is
preemptive war. Tensions between the two states might rise to the point where one state
believes that the other state is about to attack. In order to forestall such an attack, a
preemptive assault is launched. As Jervis (1976), Glaser (1992), Glaser and Hopf (1992),
and Fearon (1990) note, preemptive wars are more likely when other states are perceived
to be hostile and pose imminent threats.
According to Reiter (1995), we can examine the frequency of preemptive wars by
deriving hypotheses inspired by the spiral model. If preemptive wars are estimated to
break out frequently, then the spiral model suggests that states would be constantly
worried about threats to security. If preemptive wars would break out occasionally, then
the spiral model would predict that states might be sometimes worried about future
threats to security and cognitive miscalculations would sometimes result in war. If
beliefs about the offense-defense balance reflect the objective state of affairs and the
balance occasionally favors the offense, preemptive wars should break out occasionally.
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Preemptive wars would also be less frequent if the military believed that the offense is
dominant and the military exerted a high degree of control over foreign policy.
The second model, derived from Van Evera’s work (1999), emphasizes the
offense-defense balance. Preemptive wars, like preventive, are more likely when the
offense is posited or perceived to have the advantage on the battlefield. Advantages may
be derived from military technology, strategy, and terrain. As Reiter (1995) notes, when
offense is perceived to be dominant, wars fought for expansionist intent increase because
aggression becomes cheaper. In addition, when the offense has the advantage, future
shifts are likely to have more dire consequences.

Moreover, preemptive wars may

increase in propensity because if states believe that an adversary’s attack is more likely,
the motivation to preempt increases. There is an advantage to striking first (however, see
Jervis 1984; Schelling 1984; Quester 1984). The offense-defense theory is useful in
helping to explain why states with essentially defensive policy aims might end up going
to war with each other.
In short, there are many reasons why states might end up going to war with each
other. It is important for scholars to find out not only why states engage in war, but also
whether elites are able to persuade their constituents that war is the best option out of the
other options that might be available.
Conclusion
In order to determine whether framing effects theoretical models are significantly
different from agenda setting/priming models, we need to understand how frames work
and in particular the conditions under which frames are likely not to be effective. In short,
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we need to go beyond simply understanding framing based on subtle changes in the
wording of situations which might influence audience interpretation.
Past research conducted by Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggests that the
applicability of any given frame increases with perceptions of its relevance or strength.
What factors might be related to a frame’s relevance or strength? Frames might be
acceptable only if they are viewed as being strong in nature (e.g., they come from a
credible source for example) or if personality dispositions or values influence acceptance.
If this is the case, then speakers who want to successfully use frames must build
credibility with their constituents and can only influence certain constituents who have
certain predispositions towards the issues being framed (see Pornpitakpan 2004 for an
extensive review of the source credibility literature).
In understanding which factors encourage frames to be relevant, we must begin to
understand better the nuances which exist between different types of framing
environments (Brewer and Gross 2005; Chong and Druckman 2007a; Sniderman and
Theriault 1999, 2004). Leaders have to be very careful to take into account the nature of
their opposition because in democracies, frames engender counterframes. The media, for
example, may deliberately or involuntarily frame or contribute to attempts by others to
frame or counterframe given foreign policy situations, individual states, or the
environment. Hence, the success or failure of framing attempts by national leaders may
depend on whether the media or other third party elites such as political parties, advisers
to national leaders, political rivals or challengers, may agree or disagree with the
proposed frame being discussed. Previous work which has focused on counter-framing
has focused on direction of opinion (Sniderman and Theriault 1999, 2004), the nature and
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number of people’s thoughts about the issues being raised by competing frames (Brewer
and Gross 2005), and how competitive framing environments might differ based on
number of frames and varying strength levels associated with such frames (Chong and
Druckman 2007b).
It is important to examine framing effects from both a non-competitive and
competitive perspective because the capacity of individuals to engage in framing effects
and thus positively influence public opinion may be different depending on the framing
environment they find themselves in. Typical framing effects studies associated with
international relations employ one-sided designs in which subjects are assigned to receive
one of two different alternative representations of a given issue. These studies have
shown that if one side can establish the relevant terms of debate in conjunction with an
issue, then that side can persuade others to adopt its position. However, debates over
contentious issues such as foreign policy crises and specifically preventive war involve
competition between parties and different ideological factions. These factions present
issues to the public in opposing terms involving multiple frames of varying intensity.
In the next chapter, I will discuss my theoretical contribution which attempts to
address a novel approach to examine the conditions under which frames might be
relevant in garnering support or opposition for preventive war and vote choice.
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Chapter III
A Theory of Competitive and Non-Competitive Framing Effects
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I concentrated on the differences between agenda setting,
framing, and priming. In short, the major point I wanted to make was that framing
constitutes a distinct phenomenon from agenda-setting and priming. There is still
extensive debate in the literature concerning exactly how framing effects work. This is
problematic because the primary means by which we distinguish framing as distinct from
agenda setting and priming is based on how framing effects actually work. It is also
important to understand when framing effects are likely to work as well.
As the war in Iraq demonstrated, understanding how and when framing effects
work has imminent “policy” ramifications that have implications which extend outside of
academia. To encourage and discourage support for the war in Iraq, frames were put
forward by various elites. For example, supporters of the war like President Bush
presented frames suggesting that it was in the public’s best interests for the nation to
accept the risks associated with going to war in the present in order to avoid a more
painful, costly war against Iraq in the future. Since Iraq did not fit the mold of a “statusquo, risk averse” adversary, the costs associated with delay outweighed the costs
associated with escalation according to this perspective.
As Bush made his case concerning the reasons why the US needed to go to war, various
pundits, scholars, and media personalities offered frames concerning why going to war
was not a good idea. Elites such as the former national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft,
asserted that a unilateral invasion of Iraq might destabilize the Middle East
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and undermine efforts to deal with anti-American militant groups. Among the many
issues brought up by opponents of the war, critics such as Scowcroft claimed that the
invasion would lead to the deaths of thousands of coalition soldiers, Iraqi soldiers and
civilians. Moreover, the war would damage peace and stability throughout the region.
In order for individuals like Bush and Scowcroft to best market their cases to the
American people, both should have a good idea how and when their frames might be
received by the public. From a theoretical and “academic” standpoint, answering these
questions is vital because we do not know empirically whether leaders move public
opinion based on constituent delegation to peripheral cues such as frame source or
whether public opinion is dictated by individuals consciously deliberating over the
frames set forth by leaders.
There are two types of psychological mechanisms under which framing effects
are hypothesized to work. In the first case, framing effects work through a passive
process. Framing effects work because individuals are influenced by frames based on
peripheral cues such as frame source. For example, frames that are sponsored by a
credible source such as Colin Powell may elicit more support than frames that are
sponsored by a non-credible source such as Jerry Springer or Chris Rock. Credibility in
this context is based on the knowledge and access to information associated with the
foreign policy crises that the individual source may have. In the second case, framing
effects work because individuals buy into frames based on their strength, relevance and
applicability to the issue being discussed. Individuals, therefore, when presented with a
frame emphasizing the costs of delay associated with conflict would buy into the frame.
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only if such a frame corresponds to preconceived values or beliefs. Framing effects may
not be successful if they do not correspond to certain values possessed by individuals.
In addition to understanding how framing effects work, it is important to develop
a coherent theory to help us make predictions in regards to the potential successes or
failures of framing effects as they pertain to IR that take into account variables which
might condition such effects (Berinsky and Druckman 2007).1 Most research in IR has
presented framing effects in the context of non-competitive framing environments while
ignoring competition as a variable. Hence, we lack a theory of framing effects that is
arguably externally valid. The purpose of this dissertation is therefore two-fold: a) to
devise a theory that takes into account when constituents are likely to buy into frames
based on central or peripheral cues and b) that captures the conditional limitations
associated with the framing process as it applies to both competitive and non-competitive
framing environments. I examine the nature of framing effects in two specific contexts.
The first context is a domestic context involving vote choice. I examine the use of
framing effects in light of the 2004 election, an election that specifically highlighted
themes related to the 2003 US led War in Iraq and thus preventive war. In this case, my
interest concerns the nature of framing effects on vote choice. Is there any difference

1

Other theories that have been developed to explain framing success or failure have involved bargaining
situations between two different actors (Kanner 2004). Kanner develops a model that takes into account
the bargaining situation between a stronger actor and a weaker actor. The weaker actor wishes to change
the risk attitudes of the stronger actor thus changing the negotiating outcomes in its favor. However,
Kanner’s model does not take into account that the stronger actor might be constrained not only by the risk
attitudes it possesses, but also by the framing environment the actor may be in and the individual values of
their constituents. The theory that I am trying to develop, on the other hand, is a theory of framing taking
into account the inter-relationship that exists between elites and their constituents in multiple framing
environments.
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between competitive and non-competitive frames on the likelihood that individuals may
cast their ballot for Kerry or Bush? My major interest is to determine if there is any
systematic difference between the impact of non-competitive from competitive frames on
vote choice. Are there conditional limitations associated with framing effects based on
the issue considered, the framing environment in which the issue was presented in, and
candidates who frame such issues? The second context is an international context. Here
I want to determine the impact of non-competitive and competitive frames on public
opinion towards the preventive use of force. I am interested specifically in understanding
whether individuals are likely to buy into frames based on central or peripheral cues
provided by the frames. In addition, are individuals likely to buy into frames based on
central or peripheral cues due to individual predispositions?
Thus framing effects may operate differently depending on the type of framing
environment

(e.g.,

non-competitive,

competitive)

and

variance

in

individual

predispositions. The major assumptions associated with the theory that I wish to present
suggest that by understanding how framing effects work, we might begin to understand
when framing effects work. For example, if people buy into frames because of the
central cues they offer or if people buy into frames because they are motivated to justify a
conclusion, then frames are likely to be successful when they emphasize information that
is favorable to the public because it reinforces opinions they might adhere to. However,
if framing effects work through peripheral cues or people do not feel pressure or
motivated to justify their conclusions, then frames might work because they are
sponsored by a credible source in comparison to a non-credible source. If this is the case,
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then framing effects might work in an environment that requires individuals to exercise
less cognitive skill and strain in making their decisions. It might matter less whether the
frame itself emphasizes the costs of delay or escalation associated with conflict and
matter more whether or not Colin Powell or Jerry Springer is the sponsor of the frame.
Frame success might be highly dependent on the credibility of the individual sponsoring
the frame.
Hence, the major question that I wish to address is “How do framing effects work
and under what conditions are they likely to take place?” When I mention the term
framing effect, I am referring to emphasis framing effects and not equivalency framing
effects.2 A framing effect takes place when individuals reorient their thinking towards a
given issue based on information contained in a given frame. The important question
here is how and when a framing effect takes place.
Before discussing what the literature has to say concerning psychological
mechanisms and conditional limitations associated with the framing effects process, I will
discuss the literature associated with frames and framing effects.

2

An emphasis framing effect takes place when an individual by focusing on a subset of information
associated with an issue encourages other individuals to reorient their thinking in line with the information
being addressed. In contrast, an equivalency framing effect is said to occur when two logically equivalent
statements of a problem that are not necessarily transparent in equivalency lead individual decision makers
to select different options (Boettcher 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005;
Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). An equivalency framing effect takes place
when frames that cast information in a positive or negative light lead individuals to develop different
preferences. Such preference reversals are asserted to violate the invariance axiom which underlies the
rational choice approach.
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Frames
Communication Frames
When we refer to the term frame, we often mean a communication frame.3 The
purpose of a communication frame very simply refers to issues emphasized in elite
discourse. Its purpose is to organize reality and provide meaning to events (Chong and
Druckman 2007b). Communication frames promote particular definitions and specific
interpretations of political issues (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Tuchman 1978). They
are defined in relationship to a specific issue, event, or political actor. Communication
frames are usually organized by individuals communicating information (Scheufele
1999). Communicators make both conscious and unconscious judgments in deciding
what to say and what not to say. Communication frames, as Brewer (2003) notes, exist
within communicating texts and can be found in oral statements, newspaper articles, and
news broadcasts. These frames are most likely introduced by political entrepreneurs in
hopes that the media will disseminate them and citizens discover them, accept them, and
make judgments in association with them. Furthermore, these frames might present
information dealing with policy or strategy (Cappella and Jamieson 1997) or attribute
responsibility to a specific person or group of people based on the logical conclusions
derived from the frame (Iyengar 1991).
Since the purpose of communication frames is to organize everyday reality, the
main function of communication frames is to provide theories as to what exists, what
should happen, and what matters. Communication frames that relate to issues such as
preventive war accomplish this through influencing the attitudes possessed by individual
3

The term communication frame has been referred to as “frames embedded in political discourse” (Kinder
and Sanders 1990:74) and media frames (Entman 1993).
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constituents. In order to influence such attitudes, Gitlin (1980) notes that communication
frames rely on principles associated with selection, emphasis, and presentation. This
means that the type of information that is selected in the frame is as important as the
information that is not chosen to be part of the frame (see Kahneman and Tversky 1984).
As work by Kahneman and Tversky suggests, frames select and call attention to what
they are describing. The frame, for example, may emphasize the importance of saving
lives or the frame may emphasize the importance of losing lives. These frames are
characterized by what they omit as well as what they include. Therefore, the omission of
certain evaluations, problem definitions, and recommendations is as important to the
recipient as is what is included in the frame.
Focusing on certain considerations to the exclusion of others may influence the
direction of public opinion. A preventive war frame emphasizing the cost of delay but
not the costs of escalation may encourage individuals to favor preventive conflict. A
preventive war frame, on the other hand, emphasizing the costs of escalation but not the
costs of delay may encourage individual attitudes to favor a more diplomatic approach
(Edelman 1993; Entman 1993).

Some frames might focus on the public’s overall

attitudes towards preventive war. By focusing on such information, these frames might
exclude information concerning the normative implications of a preventive strike. In
short, what is suggested in the frame is as important as what is not suggested in the
frame. By focusing on certain information and excluding other information, elites hope
to move public opinion in a certain direction by encouraging the public to focus on
information contained in the frame.
Frames might also suggest that for actions undertaken, there is a cause and
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consequence.

Entman (1993) asserts that frames help to define problems, diagnose

causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies to problems. In defining problems,
frames help to determine what a causal agent might be doing and what the costs and
benefits of a certain action might be. In diagnosing causes, frames help to identify the
forces responsible for creating the problem. In making moral judgments, people use
frames to evaluate whether the action undertaken has positive or negative ramifications.
And in suggesting remedies to problems, frames might offer and justify treatments for
problems thus predicting their likely effects.

For example, the Cold War frame

highlighted certain foreign events such as civil wars as problems. Such a frame may also
highlight the source of the problem which might be communist rebels. People then could
make moral judgments as to the source of aggression and advocate particular solutions
based on the moral judgments advocated. In the context of a Cold War frame, an elite
figure might advocate that the best possible solution is that the US supports the side
opposite of the communist rebels (Entman 1993). In defining problems, diagnosing
causes, making moral judgments, and applying appropriate panaceas, frames help to
make sense of the complex phenomena around us. Frames may present certain issues as
correct and other propositions as incorrect. For example, proponents of preventive war
might frame such an event as possibly “reversing a decline in the relative balance of
power” with an adversary. Opponents of preventive war might frame preventive war as
unnecessary and or foolish because such war might “lead to defeat” since victory is not a
certain outcome. The words, images, and presentation styles used in communication
frames are important (Druckman 2001b).
Besides their focus on privileging certain information more than others,
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communication frames may focus on the perceptions of the decision maker in the
decision-making process and/or focus on cultural based information associated with a
topic (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). A decision frame
itself, therefore, might be a type of communication frame. A decision frame incorporates
a decision maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a
particular choice as it relates to what exists, what should happen, and what matters.
Cultural frames, according to Gamson and Modigliani (1987), might serve as a central
organizing idea or a story which is able to provide cultural meaning to a subsequent
unfolding strip of events. A frame which focuses on cultural or constructionist-based
accounts in general suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue, and
as Goffman (1974) notes, a structured understanding of the way that the world functions.
As part of the constructionist framework, the frame serves to tell a story. In this context,
the frame may present information that is either episodic in nature relying on anecdotes to
convey information or thematic in nature relying on abstract analysis to tell a story. If a
frame becomes embedded within a cultural genre, as Entman (1993) notes, the
communicator must be careful with the way he or she uses information associated with
the frame. For example, Gamson (1992) suggests that a term such as “affirmative action”
is a very controversial issue with individuals taking opposing sides to an issue. If
individual communicators demonstrate that they do not know the debate associated with
affirmative action or are unfamiliar with the term affirmative action, the individual
communicator can be either misunderstood or, worse, perceived as lacking credibility.
Frames in Thought
In addition to considering communication frames, it is also important to take into
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account frames in thought.4

An individual’s frame in thought is simply the set of

evaluative beliefs which influences how individuals perceive the external environment. It
is what an individual believes to be relevant to understanding a situation. There are two
perspectives associated with the concept frames in thought according to Brewer (2001).
One perspective suggests that individuals act as passive receivers of information.
Labeled the passive receiver hypothesis, citizens are lazy organisms who spend as little
energy as possible processing political messages. The passive receiver hypothesis is
based on the premise that framing constitutes nothing more than an extension of agenda
setting. According to scholars such as Weaver (2007), McCombs (2005), and Ghanem
(1997), there are two levels associated with the agenda-setting process. “First level”
agenda setting is focused on the relative accessibility of issue attributes. “Second-level”
agenda setting, meanwhile, is focused on the relative accessibility of issue attributes.
These attributes might simply be the issues and traits of political candidates. Scholars
such as McCombs (2005) and Ghanem (1997) suggest that these attributes are indeed
frames. McCombs (1997:37) notes that frames constitute a “selection of a restricted
number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a
particular object is discussed.” Frames are merely descriptive elements. Frames, in this
context, are not seen as reasoning devices or as appeals to causes, principles, or moral
claims.
Instead, individuals are influenced mostly by whichever political message
presented by the frame is easiest to access within memory. There are two versions
4

The term “frames in thought” is related to the schema concept. According to Entman (1993:53), the term
schema refers to “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guides individual processing of information.” The
term “frames in thought” has been referred to as “an internal structure of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders
1996:164) and individual frames (Scheufele 1999).
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associated with the “passive receiver” thesis. The strong view associated with this thesis
is advocated by Zaller (1992). Citizens in this context do not think or reason at all about
politics. They are likely to uncritically accept whichever arguments are presented.
Despite uncritical acceptance, people can reject arguments from sources that seem to lack
credibility as long as they possess the contextual knowledge necessary to judge what is
credible from what is not credible based on their values. The second version of this
thesis presented by Iyengar (1991), Iyengar and Kinder (1987), and Miller and Krosnick
(1996) suggests that the media indirectly makes some issues more accessible than others.
Exposure to frames “primes” the information invoked by the frame, thus heightening the
frame’s accessibility.
The second perspective associated with frames in thought has been labeled the
“thoughtful receiver hypothesis” (Brewer 2003). Frames in this context are seen as
causal reasoning devices appealing to individuals to consider the strength or logic
inherent in the information provided. According to this perspective, frames work because
people consciously weigh the frames presented to them and only accept those frames that
are relevant in nature. Frames work because they encourage individuals to reconsider the
importance of considerations associated with given issues, not because they help
individuals access easy to recall information. The frame that is strongest is not
necessarily the frame that is repeated the most or is the most recent frame to be presented.
Individuals are said to engage in a critical thinking process to determine which frames are
most applicable on a given issue.
The thoughtful receiver hypothesis is derived from research conducted by Ajzen
and Fishbein (1980). These scholars describe what is called a conventional expectancy
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model that is designed to help explain how frames in thought work in the framing effects
process (see also Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). In this model, Ajzen and Fishbein
(1980) place a significant amount of importance on attitudes. According to Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980), an attitude towards an object is the weighted sum or a series of
evaluative beliefs about that particular object.
In this context, one’s overall attitudes towards preventive war might be a
combination of negative and positive evaluations associated with each belief.

An

individual might assert that the initiation of preventive war could in the long-term prevent
an adversary from gaining too much power by weakening its infrastructure. This might
constitute one belief. However, at the same time, the initiation of war might create the
uncertainty of third party intervention on behalf of the adversary which may worsen the
crisis. This position might constitute another belief. If this individual places a positive
value on the costs of delay and a positive value associated with the uncertainty of third
party intervention, the attitude of individuals will depend on how they weigh and evaluate
each belief (Nelson and Oxley 1999). Of course, as Chong and Druckman (2007b) note,
such a model assumes that individuals possess beliefs towards the subject matter that are
relevant in nature.
Thus the expectancy value model takes into consideration that beliefs vary in
terms of their importance (Enelow and Hinich 1984).5 The beliefs associated with the
costs of delay might be more important than the beliefs which emphasize the importance
of third-party intervention. If only a belief such as costs of delay or third-party
intervention matters, then the individual is more likely to place all weight on that
5

The term belief has been used interchangeably with consideration (Zaller 1992), value (Sniderman 1993),
and attribute (Azjen and Fishbein 1980).
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particular attribute in the attitude-formation process. It is these sets of beliefs that
comprise an individual’s frame in thought. If the costs of delay dominate all other
considerations in deciding whether the state should go to war, then that individual’s
particular frame in thought concerns the costs of delay associated with conflict. If,
however, the individual considers not only the costs of delay, but also the probability of
victory and likelihood of third-party intervention, then his or her frame in thought is a
mixture of beliefs. One’s frame in thought influences whether or not one responds
favorably to the use of force. A “costs of delay” frame in thought might incline one to
support the use of force. A “costs of escalation” frame in thought might incline one to
not support the use of force. Zaller (1992) notes politicians try to mobilize voters behind
their specific policies by encouraging these individuals to think about these policies along
specific lines or dimensions associated with communication frames.
Framing Effect
Psychological Mechanisms
It has become fashionable in the framing literature to understand the
psychological processes that help to explain framing effects (Brewer 2001; Cappella and
Jamieson 1997; Gross 2000; Iyengar 1991; Price and Tewksbury 1997). In order to
understand what a framing effect is, we need to grasp what their psychological
mechanisms are. It is also important to determine the exact psychological mechanisms
associated with such effects in order to determine whether or not framing constitutes a
unique phenomenon separate from priming as discussed in the previous chapter.
In order for a framing effect to occur, a given belief or consideration has to be
available within a person's memory to be retrieved and used. So if the frame supporting
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the use of force is likely to have an effect, the “costs of delay” should be stored in the
person’s memory and be available to be retrieved and used. If an individual cannot
understand concepts associated with costs of delay, then the costs of delay is not an
available consideration and thus individuals are likely not to be influenced by frames
which emphasize the importance of taking into consideration “better now than later”
logic.
Second, a consideration must be accessible. In other words, the consideration
must be present in either the short-term or long-term memory to be recalled.
Accessibility is believed to increase through consistent exposure to communication
frames which are responsible for emphasizing the consideration (Iyengar 1991; Price and
Tewksbury 1997). There is a significant chance that the recipients of the highlighted
information will perceive such information, discern the meaning of the information,
process the information, and store it in memory. In this context, if individuals are
presented with frames that emphasize the costs of delay more frequently than the costs of
escalation, the consideration that is likely to be weighted heavily and perhaps applicable
in the individual’s mind in forming opinion concerns the costs of delay associated with
the use of force. Hence, it is possible that frames can influence public opinion as Higgins
(1996) and Chong and Druckman (2007b) note, through a passive and unconscious
process. In this context, framing is quite similar to priming. Citizens, according to
Miller and Krosnick (1996:96), are no better than “passive recipients of hypodermic
injections” with the information providing the “injection.” If this is the case, framing is
very much a by-product of elite manipulation as the social psychology literature would
indicate (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Iyengar 1990, 1991; Zaller 1992). If accessibility
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is the primary mediating factor explaining the framing effect process, individuals react to
stimuli in a hasty manner (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Zaller 1992).
However, in order for a framing effect to be considered a distinct phenomenon
from priming, framing effects should operate based on the frame strength or ability of the
frame to persuade.6 The considerations associated with the frame must be accessible
within the person’s memory in order for the person to comprehend whether or not the
frame presents information that is influential or not. However, not all information that is
considered accessible is relevant. Individuals weigh frames and implications associated
with such frames. Thus information associated with the frame must not only be made
accessible through regular or recent exposure, but the frame has to be seen as strong or
relevant (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Frames that are heard the most frequently may not
necessarily be the strongest. Accessibility may still be very important, because as
Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat (2003) point out, exposure might positively influence how
individuals perceive the strength of frames and thus their applicability. However,
because applicability is based largely on processes related to conscious deliberation,
Druckman (2004a) notes that individual personal motivation plays an important role in
helping to determine the potential for applicability to take place. Individuals who are
more motivated are likely to want to exert effort necessary to examine whether or not
frames are applicable in influencing their overall opinions. However, strong frames may
not necessarily possess sound logic or even be factually correct. It is important to note,
as Chong and Druckman (2007a) assert, that strong frames are not synonymous with

6

The primary focus of this dissertation is on frame strength.
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intellectually superior or morally superior arguments. Strong frames might be based on
outright lies, arbitrary symbols, etc.
Psychological mechanisms associated with strong frames operate through the
following three processes according to the thoughtful receiver hypothesis. First, beliefs
have to be available and stored in memory in order for a framing effect to work. Second,
considerations have to be accessible for use. However, if people bought into the frames
that reinforce information that is most easily accessible, framing effects would be
indistinguishable from priming effects. Whichever considerations that were emphasized
most recently or most frequently would influence public opinion the most. Third,
regardless of the recency or frequency associated with such considerations, only those
most applicable or strongest have the largest effect on overall public opinion (Nelson and
Oxley 1999). The consideration must still be accessible for it to be applicable. However,
if framing effects primarily work through applicability then certain accessible
considerations or beliefs within a person's memory may not necessarily be important in
influencing public opinion.
It is important to keep in mind exactly what a framing effect is and how it is
defined. Regardless of whether or not a framing effect primarily works in similar fashion
to priming or is a unique phenomenon, a framing effect takes place when an elite figure
influences individual frames in thought in such a way that they reflect underlying
premises associated with communication frames. Then what is the primary psychological
mechanism associated with such a process? Do frames work through a passive process?
Or do frames influence public opinion because they contain information that is
considered applicable, persuasive, or relevant?
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Conditional Limitations
Studies examining framing effects have examined variables which condition such
effects.

Scholars, as Druckman (2001b) noted, have examined four major moderators of

framing effects including: a) values; b) framing environment; c) source; and d) group
discussion setting.
Values
Predispositions, values, and need to engage in deliberation are characteristics
possessed by the receivers of the communication frames. Elites frame issues in terms of
values that are widely believed to be cherished or embraced by the public. The reason
why elites frame issues in terms of the values that are widely embraced is that citizens,
according to Brewer and Gross (2005), have a tendency to understand political issues
based on the relationship between them and their core beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).
These values are used to forge common bonds of acceptance between members of the
public and elites who frame important issues. Strong predispositions, Gross (2000) and
Brewer (2003) note, reduce the propensity for framing effects to take place by increasing
the resistance to information that is contradictory to such predispositions. As Gross
(2000) discovered, in the course of deliberating about an elite frame, people have a
tendency to compare the information that is presented in the frame itself with their own
predispositions or values. In her study, Gross (2000) employed two types of frames on
the Los Angeles race riots. She labeled one a dispositional frame and the other, a
situational frame. The dispositional frame placed blame on the individuals for the riots.
The situational frame placed blame on social conditions for the riots. Gross discovered
that individuals who are defined as unprejudiced generate counterarguments in the face of
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the dispositional frame becoming more liberal in their race and welfare opinions in the
process (see also Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Price and Na 2000). People generate
counterarguments in the face of frames they disagree with (Shah, Domke, and Wackman
1996). This research on values provides an indication that individuals do not just base
their opinions on recently and frequently heard frames as the “priming as framing”
hypothesis would predict. Rather, individuals are selective concerning the frames they
are likely to buy into based on prior predispositions and values. The values possessed by
individuals serve as conditioning limitations associated with framing effects.
Research, however, is mixed in terms of the relationship between prior knowledge
and framing effects. Price and Na (2000), Kinder and Sanders (1990), Haider-Markel
and Joslyn (2001) and Sniderman and Theriault (1999) for example, find that individuals
who possess more knowledge are less susceptible to being framed. Kinder and Sanders
(1990) note that individuals who possess extensive knowledge are likely to have strong
predispositions and therefore are less likely to be influenced by external frames.
However Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) find that the framing effect is much
stronger for those who possess greater familiarity with the arguments themselves. If
framing is likely to have an impact, it is likely to influence individual beliefs. This
argument stems from the assumption that individuals who are likely to have their beliefs
reordered are those who possess knowledge associated with the issue under
consideration. Moreover, as Druckman and Nelson (2003) suggest, the reason why
frames might influence knowledgeable citizens more than those who are less
knowledgeable is that frames allow knowledgeable citizens to connect the framed
information to their prior opinions. In short, as Druckman (2001b) points out, it is
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important to understand the relationship between knowledge and framing effects. If
those who possess less knowledge are more susceptible to framing effects then framing
effects are likely to resemble priming effects. Individuals are likely to be framed based
on manipulation. If however, framing effects are liable to take place for individuals who
possess more extensive knowledge, then individuals are more than likely consciously
engaging in deliberation in the process of buying into frames.
Framing Environment
In addition to predispositions and knowledge, the framing environment itself may
influence the conditional limitations or boundaries associated with framing effects. A
non-competitive framing environment would only present one frame. On the other hand,
a competitive framing environment would present two competing frames that are
opposites of each other. A competitive framing environment, for example, would
incorporate the presentation of a frame emphasizing the costs of delay simultaneously
with a frame emphasizing the costs of escalation. Scholars such as Sniderman and
Theriault (2004) suggest that the real world impact of a given frame is neutralized by a
counterframe which emphasizes opposing considerations. There have, however, been
few empirical studies examining the relationship between variance in framing
environment and conditional limitations associated with framing effects. Most classic
studies associated with framing effects have examined framing effects in the context of
two conditions. In one condition, the subject is presented with one frame and in the other
condition the subject is exposed to a different counterframe. The empirical studies that
have examined framing in both noncompetitive and competitive framing environments
usually examine issues that are of high importance, longstanding in nature, and of course
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competitively contested. It is unfortunate that there have been so few empirical studies
examining the relationships between different versions of framing environments because
as Sniderman and Theriault (2004) assert, people are exposed to more than one frame of
an issue usually at any given time. People are not simply exposed to preventive war in
the context of frames emphasizing the costs of delay or costs of escalation. Rather, they
are exposed in general to these different frames at the same time.
One of the earliest studies examining the nature of competition on the framing
effects process was a study conducted by Sniderman and Theriault (1999). The authors
implemented two experiments where individuals were exposed to one of two frames or
both frames simultaneously. They found that individuals exposed to only one frame at a
time were more likely to buy into the frame that was presented. However, when
presented with two frames simultaneously individuals were less likely to experience a
framing effect. Individuals are more likely to revert back to their original beliefs and
disregard the information presented in the frames.
Chong and Druckman’s (2007b) study comprises arguably the most extensive
examination involving the dynamics of framing effects in competitive contexts. In the
context of multiple framing environments, Chong and Druckman (2007b) ask whether the
number of frames in the framing environment influences public opinion more or less than
the strength of individual frames. To answer this question, participants were asked to
evaluate a local proposal in regulating development and conserving open space through
the creation of urban growth boundaries. In addition, in a second experiment, individuals
were asked to examine the rights of an extremist group to hold a rally. Subjects were
presented with competing arguments of various strengths on both sides of the issue.
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According to their findings, people’s values were a significant factor in the policy
preferences across framing conditions. The competitive context influenced both how
individuals received as well as processed information. In noncompetitive environments,
unmotivated individuals are inclined to use the considerations made accessible by the
single frame. Competitive framing environments, on the other hand, stimulated
individuals to examine the merits of alternative interpretations. As personal motivation
increased, individuals were more inclined to evaluate the applicability of frames and
therefore, only strong frames received support. Individuals who were likely to be
persuaded by weak frames in non-competitive contexts were likely not to be persuaded
by weak frames in competitive contexts. At the same time, the authors found that
competition actually stimulated individuals to express opinions reflective of their true
preferences or values. Individuals were more likely to give weight to competing
considerations on both sides of the issue when presented with competing frames. As a
result, individuals took a more moderate position than when presented with single
isolated frames.
Source
Variables such as the source of the frame, like the framing environment, operate
independently of the information associated with the frame. The persuasiveness of the
frame itself depends on the sponsor of the frame.7 Studies associated with the source
credibility hypothesis fall into two camps (see Pornpitakpan 2004 for a critical review of
the source credibility literature). There have been studies which examine the main effects
of credibility and studies which largely examine the interaction between source
7

Similarly along these lines, as Gamson and Modigliani (1987) point out, the persuasiveness of the frame
is dependent on whether the frame reflects real-world cultural themes.
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credibility and other variables. Such interaction variables have included but not been
limited to: a) the physical attractiveness of the source; b) the timing of the source
information; c) the modality of the media; d) individual disposition of the source; and e)
passage of time after exposure to communication from the source. Most of these studies
have been conducted in the mass communication and marketing literatures. Frames
delivered by credible sources are believed to more likely shift opinions than frames that
do not derive from credible sources (Druckman 2001a; Horai, Naccari, and Fatuollah
1974; Hovland and Weiss 1951; Lirtzman and Shuv-Ami 1986). Frames work because
people turn to elites for guidance (Druckman 2001a; Grewal, Gotlieb and Mamorstein
1994; Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo 1983). In prior works, source credibility has
referred to two phenomena: a) the speaker’s audience must believe that the speaker
possesses knowledge concerning the information associated with the frames he/she
wishes to present (e.g., the speaker must be an expert) and b) the target audience must
believe that the speaker is able to reveal what he or she may know (Druckman 2001a;
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia 2000). In other
words, the source must be competent and trustworthy in nature.8
I will now present the theoretical argument which will form the basis for the
ensuing empirical chapters.
Non-Competitive and Competitive Framing Effects: The Theoretical Argument
As discussed previously, the framework attempts to analyze how and when
framing effects operate. The theory makes an assumption that the framing process takes
8

Other studies have suggested that the credibility of the source depends on other foundations outside of
competence and trustworthiness. Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz (1969) identified competence, trustworthiness,
and dynamism dimensions. Whitehead (1968) identified four dimensions: trustworthiness, competence,
dynamism, and objectivity. McCroskey (1966) identified two dimensions: authoritativeness and character.

69

into account the interaction between elites and their constituents. Elites, when they
attempt to influence public opinion, do so by engaging in framing. In addition, I make
the assumption that there are conditions under which framing can and cannot work.
Elites engage in framing because the public is reliant upon elites for information (Page
and Shapiro 1992; Western 2005).

Because the public is reliant upon elites for

information, this creates an incentive for elites to manipulate information for public
consumption.

Dependence on information sources such as the media is important

because the average person may not have the ability to closely monitor events around the
world. It is this ignorance that makes individuals beholden to elites such as government
officials, journalists, and foreign policy experts for valuable information.

Elites,

therefore, attempt to gain control and spin information in such a way that they gain “an
information advantage” or “propaganda advantage” by maximizing support for their
position and minimizing support for their opponent’s position (Western 2005). Elites
may feel the need to respond to foreign policy crises that might involve heavy costs in
terms of public support and opinion. It is, therefore, important to know whether or not
elites are able to shape such opinion based on the way they present information to their
constituents. Sometimes these elites engage in competition with other elites when they
engage in framing while at other times, elites may dominate the terms of debate when
they engage in framing. Furthermore, elites that engage in framing have different levels
of credibility. Individual constituents, on the other hand, vary in terms of the firmness of
opinion held towards the use of force. They vary in terms of how they are exposed to
such information.
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Based on these assumptions, the theory I wish to develop takes into account that
we can best make predictions concerning how framing effects operate and when framing
effects operate through integrating concepts such as elites, discussion groups,
frames/framing, non-competitive/competitive framing environments, firmness of
constituent opinion, and exposure to information. Frames, quite simply, work through
exposure. Individual constituents who are exposed to such frames are more likely to be
influenced by such frames than individuals who are not exposed to them.
This explication leads to my first proposition and fundamental hypothesis:
•

P1: Frames influence public opinion based on exposure. Individuals who are
more exposed to such frames are more likely to be influenced by such frames than
individuals who are not as exposed to such frames.
In addition to frame exposure, it is important to address the role of the framing

environment: non-competitive in comparison to competitive.

The type of framing

environment is important in determining the expected degree of the framing effect. We
can expect individual constituents to moderate their opinions when faced with competing
frames presenting both sides of an issue, whereas in non-competitive framing
environments, individuals should have little impetus to moderate their positions. This
leads to my second proposition:
P2: The degree of framing effect should be more pronounced in non-competitive
framing environments in comparison to competitive framing environments.
Besides examining the main effect of the framing environment on individual opinion,

•

we also have to examine interaction effects that might exist as well. Frames have two
key components to them. The first is the substance of information associated with them.
For example, a frame might support the use of force by encouraging the president’s
constituents to consider the costs of delay if the state fails to take action against the
adversary.

On the other hand, the frame might discourage the use of force by
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encouraging the president’s constituents to consider the costs of escalation of conflict if
the state takes action against the adversary. The second component to a frame is the
individual source sponsoring the frame. The frame’s sponsor might be the president, a
journalist, a talk show host, or even a comedian. Hence, I am assuming that the source
that is sponsoring the frame might be a source that is considered an expert in the subject
or a novice in the subject (Druckman 2001a).
One of the most important interaction effects is the firmness of opinion held
towards the use of force.

Individuals might have strong, well-developed opinions

towards or against the use of force or might have weak, less-developed opinions. Of
particular relevance here is the relationship between the degree and direction of the
framing effect, the framing environment, and firmness of opinion held. In analyzing
these interaction effects, I borrow from Kunda’s (1990) work on motivated reasoning and
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1984) work on peripheral and central routes to attitude change in
examining how framing effects might work.9

According to Kunda (1990), when

individuals want to draw particular conclusions, they feel obligated to construct
justifications that can be considered to be reasonable in nature.

An individual’s

motivation provides an initial trigger for the operation of cognitive processes which lead
to the desired conclusions. As a result, only a biased subset of relevant rules and beliefs
can be accessed at any given point in time. Prior knowledge imposes constraints on
motivational biases. If this is the case, then individual motivation may bias the individual
constituent who has a firm opinion towards the use of force to accept those frames that
are reflective of preconceived values or beliefs more so than those frames that are not

9

I would like to thank Paul Brewer for bringing my attention to this link.
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reflective of preconceived values or beliefs.

However, individuals who have weak

opinions towards the use of force may not be as motivated as those who have strong
opinions to justify their conclusions. These individuals are more likely to be influenced
by frames based on who sponsors the information rather than the information provided by
the frame.
Likewise, we can draw similar conclusions based on applying Petty and
Cacioppo’s (1984) work on peripheral and central routes to attitude change. Petty and
Cacioppo (1984) note that there are two distinct routes to attitude change. The first route
they label the central route.

In this particular route, a person diligently considers

information that he or she might believe to be central to the merits of a particular
attitudinal position. The second route they label the peripheral route. The attitude issue
or object is associated with positive or negative cues. As Petty and Cacioppo (1984)
point out, a person might make a simple inference about the merits of a particular
position based on various simple cues in the persuasion context. If a particular expert in a
given field suggests the information is true, this might be enough to persuade individuals
that it indeed is true. There is very little extensive thought concerning issue arguments.
So those who possess strong opinions towards the use of force might be influenced by
frames via the central route. These individuals might be influenced by frames based on a
diligent consideration of information that they might feel is central to the merits of a
particular position. On the other hand, those who possess weak opinions towards the use
of force might be influenced by frames via the peripheral route. The person might be
influenced by the frame that the expert advocates.

Kunda’s (1990) discussion on
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motivated reasoning and Petty and Cacioppo’s (1984) work on central and peripheral
routes lead to my third and fourth propositions:
•

P3: In non-competitive and competitive framing environments, individuals with
strong opinions towards or against the use of force are likely to be influenced by
the frame based on the substance of information provided by the frame rather than
frame sponsor. In other words, those with strong opinions will use the frames
with which they agree.

•

P4: In non-competitive and competitive framing environments, individuals with
weak opinions towards or against the use of force are likely to be influenced by
the frame source associated with the frame rather than the substance of
information associated with the frame. In other words, those with weak opinions
will use the frames championed by the party they see as the most expert in the
area.
When we consider the relationship between firmness of opinion and framing

effect, it is also important to note the degree of framing effect as well. How much does
the frame influence public opinion? It is important to consider this question in light of
the framing environment. In a non-competitive framing environment, individuals who
possess strong opinions are more likely to experience weaker framing effects since the
individual frame should not have an inordinate influence on public opinion. In the same
framing environment, individuals who possess weak beliefs, on the other hand, are likely
to experience stronger framing effects because they are more dependent on the frame for
information.

The frame should have an inordinate influence on public opinion.

However, the relationship between firmness of opinion, degree of framing effect, and
framing environment should be different in competitive framing environments.

As

Chong and Druckman (2007b), Peffley and Hurwitz (2007), and Haider-Markel and
Joslyn (2001) suggest, when two competing frames come together, the weaker frame
does not have a tendency to fall on deaf ears. Rather, ineffective or weak arguments
create a contrast or boomerang effect. Individuals, when faced with competing frames,
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not only weigh each frame on its individual merits, but weigh each frame based on the
merits raised by the other frame. In this context, a comparatively weaker argument might
enhance the strength of a comparatively stronger argument. Therefore, for those who
possess strong beliefs, the framing effect might be stronger in the competitive framing
environment due to the presence of the weaker frame than it might be in a noncompetitive framing environment with only one frame presented. We should also see a
boomerang effect take place for those who possess weaker beliefs as well in competitive
framing environments. However, in this case, the boomerang effect should be created by
the non-credible source as determined by the constituent. However, the addition of a
competing frame should motivate a need to deliberate on behalf of those who possess
weak beliefs. This factor could mitigate against a boomerang effect for those who
possess weak beliefs. The following propositions follow from this analysis:
•

P5: The degree of the framing effect should be weaker for individuals who
possess strong opinions towards the use of force than for individuals who possess
weak opinions towards the use of force in non-competitive framing environments.

•

P6: The degree of the framing effect should be stronger for individuals who
possess strong opinions towards the use of force for individuals than for those
who possess weak opinions towards the use of force in competitive framing
environment due to the “boomerang effect.”

Conclusion
In order to examine how framing effects occur as well as when they occur, I have
devised an original theory that takes into consideration both processes within the context
of non-competitive and competitive framing environments. Theoretically, the
relationship between the circumstances under which framing effects function depends on
the psychological mechanisms associated with framing effects. I explored how such
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psychological mechanisms operate in non-competitive and competitive framing
environments as well as how individuals with varying strength of opinion utilize such
psychological mechanisms (e.g., central, peripheral cues) in buying into frames. These
psychological mechanisms, in turn, help to determine whether or not individuals buy into
frames based on the sponsor of the frame or frame position. Knowing this information
will help us to make predictions associated with the degree and direction of framing
effects in both competitive and non-competitive framing environments.
In the next portion of the dissertation, I will present my empirical tests associated
with these propositions. My first empirical chapter will examine the relationship between
frame exposure and impact on vote choice utilizing a non-experimental, quantitative
approach controlling for various domestic level variables. The second empirical chapter
will examine the impact of non-competitive and competitive frames on public opinion
towards the use of preventive force.
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Chapter IV
Non-Competitive Versus Competitive Framing Effects
Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between non-competitive and
competitive framing effects on public opinion. In particular, I want to examine whether
non-competitive frames influence public opinion differently from competitive frames
using the template of the 2004 election. This election was significant because it occurred
shortly after the introduction of the US led war in Iraq, which has been described as a
preventive war. Scholars have come to different conclusions concerning this question.
The prevailing view associated with this question is that the campaign has a minimal
influence on voting behavior besides reminding constituents of the opinions they hold
(Finkel 1993; Patterson 1980). In this context, the War in Iraq might have minimal
influence on voting behavior. As a result, scholars have explored the role of noncampaign factors in examining what factors may influence voting behavior. Such factors
have included personal and economic conditions (Erickson 1989; Finkel 1993; Markus
1992), presidential popularity and consumer sentiment (Holbrook 1994), and track record
of the incumbent presidency or party (Fiorina 1981). For our intents and purposes, issues
related to preventive war discussed frequently throughout the course of the campaign
might help to determine vote choice. Non-competitive frames (e.g., issues) might
enhance vote choice for one particular candidate over another and competitive frames
(issues) might moderate vote choice for the particular candidates.
What is the evidence? Scholars such as Shaw (1999) have examined aggregate
differences in voting behavior based on campaign behavior whereas others have focused
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on the nature of elite rhetoric and voter evaluations (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Although
this research is ground-breaking and important, it does not address how the nature of the
communication environment might influence voting behavior in an election where
preventive war is considered a salient issue. This is problematic to this study because
individual candidates reinforce attitudes in ways that affect voter turn-out and vote
choices through engaging in framing related activities (Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw
2001; Brosius and Kepplinger 1992; Chong and Druckman 2010; Dearing and Rogers
1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar and Simon 2000; Johnston et al.1992; Sheafer
and Weimann 2005; Zaller 1992, 1996).
In this chapter, I utilize a content analysis of media campaign coverage in the New
York Times of the 2004 US presidential election. In particular, I focus on how media
frames, both competitive and non-competitive, determine vote choice for each candidate.
Frames operate as proxies for issue ownership and tone of media coverage.

Non-

competitive frames present one side of an issue and suggest that one candidate is able to
dominate that issue based on the tone of media coverage. Competitive frames present two
sides of an issue and suggest that that particular issue is contested in the context of media
coverage. Examination of how frames work has taken place in the artificial setting of the
lab as well as through the use of hypothetical questionnaire scenarios. As a result, many
of these findings do not take into account the contextual factors associated with the
political decision making process. Examining framing effects in the context of a realworld election campaign should help us to understand how frames interact with
contextual factors better. After examining framing effects in this real-world context, I
find evidence to suggest that frames had minimal effect in influencing voting behavior.
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Important issues influenced the voting behavior of non-attentive constituents in
similar fashion to attentive constituents. In addition, non-competitive frames did not
significantly influence vote choice and competitive frames did not moderate vote choice
as the theory would predict. Hence, we cannot make the argument that it was exposure to
frames which helped to determine vote choice. In addition, only a select number of noncompetitive and competitive frames influenced opinion in a significant direction.
Moreover, the most salient frames did not affect vote choice as hypothesized. This study,
as a result, argues that frames may have minimal effect in determining individual vote
choice.
Campaign Effects
If we are to make the assumption that elites engage in framing related behavior in
a number of framing related environments, how should we actually measure such effects
as it pertains to the campaign. As Druckman (2004b) notes, there are problems with
using experimental research to examine the nature of a campaign on voting behavior.
Media effects associated with experiments tend to be short-lived (Althaus, Nardulli, and
Shaw 2001; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Kuklinski et al. 2000). If an experimental
approach were to be employed in examining the influence of a campaign on voting
behavior, at best we would garner a basic understanding concerning how individuals
might respond to campaign events or short-term stimuli, not necessarily understanding
how individuals might respond to the totality of a campaign over time. In general,
outside of certain exceptions, experiments have not considered time as an important
variable (see however Chong and Druckman 2007b). Taking into account the artificiality
of the laboratory, the limited number of test subjects associated with experimentation
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(most are derived from convenience samples of college undergraduates), and the fact that
the time element is difficult to manipulate in an experimental setting (e.g., experimental
fatigue, loss of participants, etc.), it would be very difficult to acquire externally valid
results in the context of examining the influence of a campaign on voting behavior.
Ideally, the best approach is to measure the influence of frames on voting behavior over a
specific period of time utilizing a randomly selected sample of the population in the
process.
Hence, when I am measuring the influence of the campaign on voting behavior, I
am measuring the extent to which frames (non-competitive and competitive in nature)
influence voting behavior. If the campaign influences voting behavior, then the frames
put forth in the campaign should influence the choice of either voting for Kerry or Bush.
And if the frames themselves are to influence voting behavior, they should do more than
simply influence specific campaign events which are stochastic in nature.
The last important issue that I should discuss in terms of measuring campaign
influence focuses on the impact of the frames on voting behavior. In particular, we
need to examine if it is the framing environment that is responsible for leading to a
change in voting behavior. Hence, the research design should be constructed in such a
way that we can prove or show that those exposed to the media frame/s reacted
differently than those that did not react to or were exposed to the media frames. In order
for this to take place, the research design for such a venture must address the following
three items. First, the voters must be actually exposed to the information associated with
the campaign.

Second, we should be able to measure or identify issues that are

competitive from issues that are non-competitive. Lastly, we have to provide evidence
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that it was indeed the campaign (e.g., the frames) that led to changes in vote choice for
either Kerry or Bush and not alternative explanations such as party identification, income,
gender, education levels, or prior knowledge.
Research Strategy
The main reason why experiments have been incorporated to measure framing
effects is that it is easy to establish control. Holding all control variables constant, we
can establish whether or not the frames themselves influenced the dependent variables of
importance. However, as has been stated before, experimental approaches are not the
most optimum method for measuring the effects of a campaign on voting behavior. The
strategy that I wish to employ takes into account that frames are initiated in a campaign
repeatedly over time, not in a brief thirty minute setting in an artificially induced
environment and only once in such a sitting.
Specifically, this paper focuses on the 2004 US presidential election. I examine
campaign content through an intensive content analysis of the New York Times. This is a
major newspaper that features a wide audience of subscribers.

Most importantly,

however, researchers focus on the New York Times because it tends to lead to other news
coverage and thus provides a good indicator for the nature of US news coverage. It is
possible, therefore, to make the argument that the political topics discussed in the New
York Times is representative of mainstream news coverage.
I will examine the impact of the campaign by taking a look at questions associated with
the 2004 NES data set. These questions allow me to probe the role of the most important
aspects of the 2004 campaign that might serve as underlying frames to influence vote
choice.

Using NES data, I incorporate measures associated with vote choice,
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demographic related issues that affect vote choice, as well as the impact of competitive
and non-competitive media frames. However, because the NES data are not collected in
the context of an exit poll, this data may not adequately assess people’s reasoning as it
pertain to vote choice directly but to short term stimuli independent of vote choice.
Despite the inherent weaknesses associated with a cross-sectional design, the
design itself is able to provide insight in examining the variance associated with framing
environments and voters’ decisions. Relatively speaking, those who have been exposed
to the media frames are more likely to be influenced by them. As it pertains to this
study, non-competitive frames should influence vote choice and competitive frames
should moderate vote choice more for those who are exposed to these frames than those
who are not exposed to such frames.
In this chapter, I test the following hypotheses:
•

H1 (P1): Individuals who are more exposed to such frames are more likely to be
influenced by such frames than individuals who are not as exposed.

•

H2 (P2): The degree of framing effect should be more pronounced in noncompetitive framing environments in comparison to competitive framing
environments.

The 2004 US Presidential Campaign
The 2004 presidential election pitted George W. Bush, the Republican incumbent
against John Kerry, the Democratic challenger. In an extremely close and controversial
election, Bush was elected to the presidency in 2000. He won the electoral vote despite
losing the popular vote. His first term was marked by the tragedy of the terrorist attacks,
which occurred on September 11th, 2001, only eight months after his election. Shortly
after these attacks, Bush announced a global war on terrorism, which featured an invasion
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of Afghanistan that same year and an invasion of Iraq in 2003. In addition, Bush made
significant inroads pertaining to domestic policy, signing into law broad tax cuts, the No
Child Left Behind Act which reformed educational accountability standards, and
Medicare prescription drug benefits for seniors. Moreover, the president emphasized the
importance of creating private investment accounts as part of a social security reform
package and opposed mandatory carbon emissions controls.
John Kerry, his opponent, was a Senator from Massachusetts. Kerry and other
Democrats attacked Bush on the Iraq War, and accused him of failing to do enough to
stimulate the economy. At the same time, Kerry claimed that the Bush administration
presided over skyrocketing health care costs, a lack of regulatory attention to the
environment, and poor job growth. The Bush campaign countered that Kerry was a “flip
flopper,” making contradictory statements concerning the war in Iraq and lacked the
decisiveness and vision necessary to successfully propagate the war on terrorism. In the
2004 election, Bush carried 31 of 50 states, and received a total of 286 electoral votes. In
addition to winning the majority of electoral votes, Bush also won the popular vote, with
50.7% in comparison to Kerry who received 48.3%.
Method
To capture campaign content, I performed a content analysis of the New York
Times from September 3, 2004 (the day after Bush’s acceptance speech at the RNC) until
November 2, 2004. There were two coders on this particular project.10 Since there was
coverage associated with the election every day, this resulted in 61 days of coverage. I
analyzed every newspaper article on the presidential campaign that had the words “Bush”

10

Jean K. Guse was the other coder on this project.
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or “Kerry” written. I then coded each article for a number of specific characteristics,
including position (lead, non-lead) and type (editorial, non-editorial). Altogether, I
considered a total of 14 different frames (3 competitive, 11 non-competitive). The goal of
the content analysis was simply to capture the most important frames of the election and
categorize them as either non-competitive or competitive in nature. I simply counted the
number of paragraphs associated with the issue. If the number of paragraphs associated
with each issue favored a particular candidate by a 2:1 margin in a particular article that
featured either Bush or Kerry, I coded the issue as being non-competitive in nature. If the
issue discussed in the article was a non-competitive frame, it specifically advocated on
behalf of a particular candidate’s position on the issue in comparison to another or
debunked a particular candidate’s position on an issue without giving equal time to the
opposing side of the issue. Furthermore, a candidate sponsoring a non-competitive frame
might put a positive “spin” on an issue he or she feels is important to electoral chances.
The individual candidate who was on the winning end of the particular issue in that
article would receive one point, indicating a non-competitive frame in association with
that issue. However, if the article considered both viewpoints on the issue or if both
candidates echoed competing interpretations of that particular issue in the same article,
each candidate would receive a half a point on the issue indicating that issue was
competitively framed. I determined an issue as being framed in a competitive fashion if
the number of paragraphs for each particular candidate on a particular issue was less than
a 2:1 ratio.
After coding each article in this way, to determine a competitive frame from a
non-competitive frame, I simply counted the number of points associated with each
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particular issue in each article in relationship to each of the candidates. I then divided the
point totals accrued by each candidate by the total number of points calculated on the
issue. If the candidate that was awarded the majority of points received 66.7% or more of
the points on that particular issue, I categorized the issue in the election as being noncompetitive in nature. If the lead candidate received less than 66.6% of the points on the
issue in the election, then I categorized the issue as being competitively framed. In
addition, if the article mentioned a particular issue and took a particular position on that
issue or focused on particular positions on this issue, this was counted as one frame.
Regardless of how many times the article mentioned the issue; each issue was counted as
constituting one frame. Hence at most each article could contain one frame on a
particular issue.
Table 1 focuses on summary statistics from the analyses, in particular data from
the New York Times. Each day, the New York Times discussed the campaign with an
average of 13.8 stories per day. In addition, the table indicates that the paper utilized
non-competitive frames 63.3% of the time and competitive frames 36.7% of the time. Of
the non-competitive frames, 76.8% of these frames supported John Kerry and 23.2%
adopted positions supporting George W. Bush.11

11

Of the issues that were competitively framed, 45% of these frames supported Bush and 55% of these
supported Kerry.
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Table 1
New York Times News Coverage of the 2004 US Presidential Campaign
New York Times
Average percentage of days of presidential campaign coverage
Average number of campaign stories on a given day
Average percentage of stories with competitive frame
Average percentage of stories with non-competitive frame
Average percentage of pro-Kerry non-competitive frames
Average percentage of pro-Bush non-competitive frames
Average percentage of pro-Kerry competitive frames
Average percentage of pro-Bush competitive frames

100%
(n=61)
13.8
(n=61)
36.7%
(n=61)
63.3%
(n=61)
76.8%
(n=61)
23.2%
(n=61)
45.5%
(n=61)
55.5%
(n=61)

Figures 1 and 2 show the proportion of space devoted to the top non-competitive
and competitive frames adopted (in proportion to the total number of frames examined).
In contrast to the other issues, which received scant attention, non-competitive frames
involving Iraq, health care, and job growth received the most attention. Of the 11 noncompetitive issues that were coded, these three issues alone accounted for 76.3% of the
non-competitive frames. Compared to Iraq, however, health care is significantly less
important, (z =15.325; p<.01 for a two-tailed difference of proportions test). In this
particular study, the Iraq War was strongly considered the strength of John Kerry.12
12

Of the 488 frames associated with Iraq, Kerry received 79% favorable frames in comparison to 21% for
George W. Bush. Of the 168 frames associated with health care related issues, Kerry received 74% of the
favorable frames; Bush 26%. Lastly, of the 122 frames associated with job growth, Kerry received 83% of
the favorable frames and Bush 17%. Intercoder reliability tests were performed on each of the issues
related to the noncompetitive frames. Intercoder reliability indexes are in parenthesis. Of the 43 frames
recoded focusing on Iraq, Kerry received 73.2% favorable frames in comparison to 26.8% for George W.
Bush (92.7%). Of the 20 frames associated with health care, Kerry received 87.5% of the favorable frames
and Bush, 12.5% of the favorable frames (84.6%). Of the 18 frames associated with job growth, Kerry
received 80.6% of the favorable frames and Bush, 19.4% favorable frames (97.1%).
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Of the three issues that were categorized as competitive frames, government
spending/services did not significantly receive more attention than anti-terrorism related
issues. Other competitive frames received scant attention. Of the 269 frames analyzing
government spending/services, Kerry received 64.7% of the favorable frames in
comparison to 35.3% for Bush. Of the 267 frames analyzing national security related
issues discussing the war on terrorism, Bush received 54% of the favorable frames in
comparison to 46% for Kerry.13 In sum, the election revolved around three major frames,
Iraq, anti-terrorism, and government spending/social services. I thus anticipate that those
who are exposed to the campaign will be influenced by these three frames the most. In
particular, the war in Iraq should increase voter choice for Kerry. Meanwhile, the antiterrorism issue, since it is a competitive frame, should moderate support for either
candidate. And even though government spending/social services is classified as a
competitive frame based on the coding procedures, the percentages are heavily skewed in
Kerry’s direction. So it should not be a surprise if this particular frame increases voter
choice for Kerry.
Assessment of Campaign
To assess the impact of the campaign, I utilize NES data from the 2004
presidential elections. To evaluate the criteria underlying vote choice for Bush or Kerry,
I incorporate measures associated with non-competitive frames (Iraq War, health care,

13

Intercoder reliability tests were performed on each of the issues related to the competitive frames.
Intercoder reliability indexes are in parenthesis. Of the 23 frames recoded associated with the antiterrorism issue, Kerry received 52.7% favorable frames in comparison to 47.3% for George W. Bush
(87.6%). Of the 24 frames associated with government spending/services, Kerry received 69.5% of the
favorable frames and Bush, 31.5% of the favorable frames (93.1%).
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job growth), competitive frames (anti-terrorism, government spending/services), and
demographic variables.14
In particular, to gauge respondents’ views towards terrorism, I examined their
beliefs on the importance of combating international terrorism. In short, as the issue
becomes more important for the respondent, we should see anti-terrorism moderate voter
choice for attentive voters more so than for those who are non-attentive since antiterrorism is a competitive frame. In addition, I examined the importance of government
spending/services.
I then gauged non-competitive frames by examining issues associated with the
Iraq War, health care, and job growth. I wanted to examine the level of importance each
individual placed on the issue. In particular, to assess the importance of the Iraq War, I
examined responses towards intervention and diplomacy. To assess the importance of
the job growth issue, I examined responses towards guaranteed job self-placement.
Finally, to assess the importance of the health care issue, I examined responses towards
the government health insurance issue. In short, because these frames are all noncompetitive in nature, as the issue becomes more important for the respondent, we should
see these issues intensify voter choice for Kerry for attentive voters more than those who
are non-attentive. As indicated in Table 2, I also include standard control variables such
as ideology, party identification, class, religion, gender, age, racial/ethnic group, and
education. I incorporated political knowledge as a control variable taking into account
that even if individuals are classified as non-attentive voters, they still might be exposed
to frames based on high levels of knowledge in association with the issues. I measured
14

When examining the frame government spending/services, I examined issues related to the budget, fiscal
policy, social security, housing, and education.
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political knowledge based on two questions: one asking respondents to identify the
political office that House Speaker Dennis Hastert holds and the other one asking
respondents what office William Rehnquist holds. I coded this variable as an index. If
the constituent did not correctly identify Rehnquist or Hastert, I coded this as a 0. If the
constituent correctly identified Rehnquist or Hastert, I coded this as a .5. Lastly, if the
constituent correctly identified both Rehnquist and Hastert, I coded this as a 1.
Table 2
Description of NES Respondents
Variable

Presidential Vote Choice
Ideology
Party ID
Religion

Gender
Ethnicity

Class
Education
Age
Political Knowledge
Attention (TV)
Attention (Newspaper)

Sample Data

Voted for Kerry, 48.5%; Voted for Bush, 50.1%;
Voted for Nader, .5%
Conservative, 55.3%; Moderate, 7.5%;
Liberal, 36.7%
Favor Democratic Party, 44.8%; Favor Republican Party,
48%
Religion provides a great deal of guidance, 35.5%;
Religion provides quite a bit of guidance, 23.9%;
Religion provides some guidance, 18%;
Religion is not important, 22.6%
Male, 47%; female, 53%
White, 71.5%; African American, 14.5%; Asian
American, 2.4%; Hispanic, 6.2%;
other/no answer, 4.2%
Upper Class, .9%; Middle Class, 43.8%;
Working Class, 50.3%; Lower Class, 3.7%
High school or less, 38%; some college, 22%;
college degree, 28%; advanced degree, 12%
18-24, 11%; 25-34, 17%; 35-44, 18%; 45-54,
20%; 55-64, 18%; 65-74, 10%; 75+, 6%
0 Correct, 67%; 1 correct, 21%; 2 correct, 12%
A great deal or quite a bit, 42%; Some and very little, 34%;
None, 1%
A great deal or quite a bit, 24%; Some and very little, 29%;
None, 1%

I tested for framing effects by comparing the responses of those attentive to the
campaign (denoted “attentive voter”) to those respondents who were not attentive to the
campaign (denoted “non-attentive voter”). The dependent variable was vote choice (0 =
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Bush, 1 = Kerry). My assumption is that attentive voters should pay closer attention to
the issues related to the election. As a result, if frames work, those issues framed in noncompetitive fashion should suppress vote choice for Bush and increase vote choice for
Kerry in comparison to non-attentive voters. And those issues that are framed in
competitive fashion should moderate vote choice for either of the candidates in
comparison to non-attentive voters.
To measure campaign exposure and attention, I examined how much attention the
subjects paid to the campaign discussed in the newspaper and on the television. Since the
NES data does not specify whether the subject read or had access to the New York Times
specifically, I could not directly measure respondent access to the specific frames put
forth by this particular newspaper. This is a significant inference problem given the fact
that it is not certain individuals polled in the NES data had access specifically to frames
presented in the New York Times. In addition, individuals also receive access to
information from alternative media outlets such as the blogosphere. Despite this
weakness in the research design, people do receive substantial campaign information
from the local newspaper and television (Druckman 2004b: Mondak 1995). In addition,
the New York Times helps to set the tone for local media news coverage given the fact
that local newspapers much like the New York Times similarly receive their information
from Reuters and the AP press outlet.
Those individuals who read the local newspaper and paid attention to it on the
television should in general have greater access to frames presented by the media than
those who have not paid attention to a local newspaper. Even though my measure is a far
from ideal measure since local newspapers and TV news outlets may decide to frame
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issues different from the New York Times and attention may not be synonymous with
processing, the measure I adopt is superior to subjective measures such as “general
personal interest” in a campaign. As Druckman (2004b) points out and Southwell et. al.
(2002) allude to, individuals may not remember how much personal interest they have in
a campaign but have a better time of recalling how closely they pay attention to what is
written in the newspaper. Those voters who paid a “great deal of attention” or “quite a
bit” of attention to newspaper articles and/or the TV news are coded as being “attentive
voters.” Those voters who paid “some,” “very little,” or “no” attention to newspaper
articles and TV news focusing on the campaign I coded as being “non-attentive” voters.
Finally, to test for framing effects, I regressed vote choice on both the issues associated
with non-competitive and competitive frames as well as all control variables for all
respondents. Then I regressed these aforementioned variables on just attentive voters and
then on non-attentive voters. All variables in the logit model are standardized into a 0 or
1 format and the methodological approach is a binary logit approach. Higher values on
all issues indicate movement towards Kerry since I coded a vote for Kerry as 1 and vote
for Bush as 0.
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Table 3
Framing Presidential Voting
Anti-Terrorism
Iraq
Government Spending
Health Care
Job Growth
Ideology
Gender
Race
Age
Education
Knowledge
Religion
Class
Party

Attentive
-3.82***
(1.37)
-.259
(.755)
-.226
(.795)
-.365
(.873)
.121
(.735)
1.34***
(.473)
.491
(.411)
-1.14**
(.484)
1.23*
(.649)
.198
(.510)
.326
(.611)
-.635
(.528)
.895
(.587)
5.06***
(.522)

Non-Attentive
-2.47*
(1.32)
-.876
(.874)
-.920
(.958)
1.10
(1.18)
-.260
(.883)
.969
(.669)
-.381
(.561)
-.910
(.672)
-.149
(.921)
-.955
(.659)
-.785
(1.17)
-.001
(.710)
-.134
(.834)
5.28***
(.754)

433

223

News
TV
News*Anti-Terrorism
News*Iraq
News*Government
Spending
News*Health Care
News*Job Growth
TV*Anti-Terrorism
TV*Iraq
TV*Government
Spending
TV*Health Care
TV*Job Growth
TV*News*AntiTerrorism
TV*News*Iraq
TV*News*Government
Spending
TV*News*Health Care
TV*News*Job Growth
N

Everyone
-22.8**
(9.32)
-3.95
(4.79)
.462
(4.37)
16.6**
(6.9)
-2.77
(4.81)
1.91***
(.629)
1.07**
(.567)
-1.11*
(.655)
2.29**
(.912)
-.510
(.632)
688
(.876)
-.429
(.734)
-.429
(.721)
6.10***
(.722)
2.81
(5.28)
-6.63
(10.16)
18.1*
(15.8)
6.54
(8.94)
-1.13
(7.24)
-28.4**
(11.7)
6.30
(8.58)
22.7**
(10.8)
2.23
(6.18)
-2.30
(6.60)
-17.1**
(8.8)
3.00
(6.35)
-24.9**
(16.8)
-3.80
(10.2)
2.99
(9.80)
28.4**
(13.6)
-5.84
(10.4)
373
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Results
The third column of Table 3 shows that all voters, taken together, based their vote
on party identification, race, ideology, gender, and the anti-terrorism issue. However,
none of the other issues influenced vote choice.

Individuals who believed that the anti-

terrorism issue was extremely important were more likely to vote for George W. Bush
and less likely to vote for John Kerry. Those who were affiliated with the Democratic
Party were more likely to vote for John Kerry. In addition, minority groups and
individuals who possess a liberal ideology were more likely to vote for John Kerry and
less likely to vote for George Bush.
The first and second columns of Table 3 separate out the attentive from the nonattentive voters. As the first column indicates, attentive voters base their vote on the
anti-terrorism issue.

Non-attentive voters also based their decision to cast their ballot on

the anti-terrorism issue. As the anti-terrorism issue became more important, nonattentive voters were more likely to cast their vote for George Bush. As a result, they are
less likely to perceive the anti-terrorism issue as a competitive issue. This might perhaps
account for the strong support for George Bush. However, this does not take into account
that the terrorism issue failed to moderate vote choice for attentive voters as well. Party
identification mattered for both types of voters in the anticipated direction. Race and
ideology influenced vote choice for attentive voters. In neither case was the war in Iraq
significantly related to vote choice. However, given the way this variable is
operationalized in the NES data set (e.g., importance of diplomacy/intervention), this
variable might not fully capture the extent to which individuals support or oppose the war
in Iraq.
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To establish the impact of the anti-terrorism issue on attentive and non-attentive
voters, I examined the predictive probabilities of voting for Kerry as indicated in Figure
1a , holding all variables at their median values but then varying attentive and nonattentive voters’ values for the anti-terrorism issues. For example, if the median nonattentive voter believes that the anti-terrorism issue (0) is not important, the probability of
voting for Kerry is 84%. If the anti-terrorism issue is extremely important, the
probability of voting for Kerry is 30%. For the attentive voter the predicted probability
changes in similar fashion from 98% to 45%. Attentive voters based their votes on the
second most salient competitive image. However, access to the anti-terrorism frame did
not moderate vote choice for attentive voters. Attentive voters, as a result, were not
significantly different from non-attentive voters as identified in Figure 1b.
Figure 1a. Effect of Anti-Terrorism Self-Placement on Voting for Kerry
(Attentive Voters)

.4

Probability of Voting for John Kerry
.6
.8

1

Attentive Voters

0

.5
1
Values of Anti-Terrorism
Figure 3a. Effect of Anti-Terrorism variable on the probability of voting for Kerry
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Figure 1b. Effect of Anti-Terrorism Self-Placement on Voting for Kerry
(Non-Attentive Voters)

.3

Probability of voting for John Kerry
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8

Non-Attentive Voters

0

.5
1
Values of Anti-Terrrorism
Effect of Anti-Terrorism variable on the probability of voting for Kerry
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To further examine the nature of the framing effect, I reran the model and
included a dummy variable for individuals who paid attention to the campaign on TV and
newspaper in the fourth column. In addition, I include interaction effects for newspaper
and issue independent variables and interaction effects for TV and issue independent
variables. These measures specifically address whether it was attention to the TV or
newspaper which helped to determine the importance of issues on vote choice. In
addition, I included three way interaction effects for TV, news, and issue important
variables.
The results are shown in the final column of the table. There are significant twoway interaction effects between news and health care, TV and health care, and TV and
anti-terrorism. Hence, not surprisingly, we can make the argument that TV viewership,
not newspaper coverage seems to be influencing vote choice in regards to the terrorism
issue. Moreover, there are three-way interaction effects among TV, news, and health
care. In this context, framing effects manifested themselves among constituents who
attended to the campaign on TV and in the newspaper.
Given the inconsistent evidence presented by these findings, it is important to
qualify the impact that campaigns have on shaping the criteria on which voters base their
votes. Two implications follow from this assertion. First, if attentive and non-attentive
voters support candidates based on similar issues given their importance, candidates have
fewer incentives to try getting issues most favorable to them on their agenda. The
motivation to sway attentive voters is less significant if these voters behave in similar
ways to non-attentive voters. Second, issues might be so important that individuals have
deep seeded beliefs regardless of access to frames. As a result, issues that might be
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framed in a competitive fashion might create a boomerang effect. Hence, rather than
moderating support for a particular political candidate, opposing views might solidify
opinion solidly in one direction. Hence, this might explain why those who viewed antiterrorism as important and had access to the frame might strongly support George W.
Bush in comparison to John Kerry.
Conclusion
This research presents a novel approach to helping scholars understand the
influence that campaigns might have on the voting behavior process. Scholars in recent
years have attempted to incorporate framing type approaches to help us understand how
communication might influence such campaigns (Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2001).
Work on framing, in particular, has been relegated to that of the laboratory. If we take
this approach to examining the influence of campaigns, we will end up knowing more
about specific responses to campaign events than responses to the campaign as a whole.
The study here indicates that at best, frames are extremely limited in their influence on
vote choice. Voters are more likely to determine their vote choice based on demographic
variables (e.g., race, party identification). However, given the fact that the New York
Times has a decidedly liberal bent, determining what is truly a competitive and noncompetitive issue should be qualified. Since regional variation exists in the newspaper
coverage of the 2004 elections, the findings associated with this study should be
qualified. Following Trumbore (2009), future work should take into consideration
regional variation in newspaper coverage.

Local newspapers in certain geographical

regions might frame the anti-terrorism issue differently. Hence future research must take
into account a more representative sample of local newspapers and TV news outlets in
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order to truly convey which issues were non-competitive and which issues were
competitive.
Second, future work should also emphasize other important variables that might
influence voter attentiveness. In particular, future work should examine the length of
time before an election that a vote choice is made. Individuals who make up their mind
early on in the campaign as to who they will cast their vote for might be more likely to
pay less attention to the campaign. In contrast, individuals who decide late in the
campaign season who to vote for might be more attentive to the issues addressed in the
campaign. These issues should serve as a cue to help an undecided or independent voter
cast his or her ballot. Intriguing questions might address the circumstances in which
framing effects are contingent on circumstances involving length of time needed in order
to cast a vote. In contrast, it is possible that those who make up their mind early in the
campaign season do so because they are attentive to the issues and the way they are
addressed during the campaign season.
Third, future work should further address the relationship between issue
ownership and framing. As Goble and Werner (2005) along with Goble and Holm
(2009) point out, voters typically respond to appeals from the parties that own the issue.
For example, the Republican Party is generally acknowledged to possess an ownership
over national security issues whereas the Democratic Party is generally perceived to
possess an ownership over health care issues. Hence, in order to truly understand if
frames operate in a real world setting such as a campaign, we have to know if the ability
of a leader to use frames is dependent on the ideological advantage the leader might have
in regards to the issues the frame sponsors. It is possible to do this by examining a more
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representative, regional variety of newspapers. In doing so, we can begin to take steps to
hold issue ownership constant and attribute differences which do occur in vote choice to
the influence of frames.
Fourth, future work should address the relationship between issue ownership and
Congress. In particular, are members of Congress more willing to decouple the party’s
reputation from that of the president by distancing themselves from his policies based on
the competitiveness of the issues the policies were based on? As Goble and Holm (2009)
point out, members of the Republican Congress were hesitant to vote against President
Bush’s policies on Iraq despite heavy criticism. National security issues, in general, have
traditionally been an uncontested Republican issue. Would members of Congress have
been just as hesitant to vote against the president if the issue itself was historically one
that neither party owned?
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Appendix A Codebook
Content Analysis Procedure
Pro Bush Anti-Terrorism Frame – Suggests President Bush has the right strategy and
ideology to combat international terrorism. President Bush has the resolve to combat
international terrorism as Commander-in-Chief; we need a leader who is strong and
decisive in combating international terrorism. One can trust President Bush as
Commander-in-Chief in combating international terrorism. President Bush will
destroy/defeat international terrorists and those that aid and harbor them; grant peace,
safety, protection, and guidance to prevent a future terrorist attack; will devote the
necessary resources to combat international terrorism; has the vision necessary to combat
international terrorism; has a competent administration necessary to combat international
terrorism; and will keep the proper perspective necessary to combat international
terrorism to win and keep the public trust. Kerry lacks the resolve, commitment,
decisiveness, and perspective necessary to successfully combat international terrorism as
Commander-in-Chief; lacks the right strategy, ideology, vision, and perspective to
combat international terrorism; does not deserve the public trust to combat international
terrorism; will not be strong and decisive in combating international terrorism; will not
destroy international terrorists and those that aid and harbor them; and will not have the
proper administration in place necessary to grant peace, safety, protection, and guidance
to prevent a future terrorist attack.
Pro Kerry Anti-Terrorism Frame – Consists of an explicit rejection or rebuttal of the ProBush national security frame. President Bush’s perception in combating international
terrorism is uni-dimensional; we cannot combat terrorism by military means alone.
President Bush’s strategy in combating terrorism creates more enemies than friends.
President Bush is unable or unwilling to gain the support of our allies necessary in
combating international terrorism. The public cannot trust President in combating
international terrorism; President Bush will not destroy/defeat international terrorists and
those that aid and harbor them; will not grant peace, safety, protection, and guidance to
prevent a future terrorist attack; will not devote the necessary resources to combat
international terrorism; does not have the vision necessary to combat international
terrorism; does not have a competent administration necessary to combat international
terrorism; and will not keep the proper perspective necessary to combat international
terrorism to win and keep the public trust. Kerry has the resolve, commitment, and
nuanced perspective necessary to successfully combat international terrorism as
Commander-in-Chief; has the right strategy, ideology, vision, and perspective to combat
international terrorism; deserves the public trust to combat international terrorism; will be
strong and decisive in combating international terrorism; will destroy international
terrorists and those that aid and harbor them; and will have the proper administration in
place necessary to grant peace, safety, protection, and guidance to prevent a future
terrorist attack.
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Pro Bush Iraq Frame – Suggests that President Bush is committed to fighting and
winning the war in Iraq; he has the right strategy, people and resources in place to fight
and win the war in Iraq. Under the leadership of President Bush and his administration
the US and its allies are making impressive gains in Iraq and achieving political, military,
humanitarian, social, cultural, and economic progress. President Bush made the right
decision to militarily intervene in Iraq. The world, Middle East, and US, a much safer
place without Saddam Hussein in power, the use of force in Iraq is sponsored by
multilateral rather than unilateral forces, uses of force are not meant to extend US empire
or hegemonic interests or concerns in Iraq or in the surrounding region. John Kerry is not
committed to fighting and winning the war in Iraq, would not have the right strategy,
people, and resources in place to fight and win the war in Iraq, is wrong to oppose the
war in Iraq, is wrong to suggest that the war is conducted for hegemonic interests or is
being conducted unilaterally, and is wrong to assume that the US is not making
impressive gains in politically, military, socially, culturally, and economically in Iraq.
Kerry’s policies in Iraq would leave the world, Middle East, and US vulnerable to its
adversaries.
Pro Kerry Iraq Frame –Consists of an explicit rejection and rebuttal of the Pro-Bush Iraq
frame. Bush’s strategy in Iraq is disastrous, incompetent, steeped in cronyism, has the
wrong strategy, people and resources in place to fight and win the war in Iraq. Under the
leadership of President Bush and his administration the US and its allies are harming Iraq
politically, militarily, and economically. President Bush made the wrong decision to
militarily intervene in Iraq. The world, Middle East, and US, a much dangerous place
based on the decision to intervene in Iraq, the use of force in Iraq is unilateral rather than
multilateral, uses of force are meant to extend US empire or hegemonic interests or
concerns in Iraq or in the surrounding region. John Kerry is committed to fighting,
winning and/or ending the war in Iraq, would have the right strategy, people, and
resources in place to fight, make progress militarily, culturally, economically, and win the
war in Iraq. John Kerry will fight the war in Iraq from a multilateral rather than from a
unilateral position.
Pro Bush Government Spending/Services Frame – Consists of explicit support for Bush’s
policies concerning the budget, fiscal policy such as taxes and the budget deficit, housing,
education, and social security and explicit rejection of Kerry’s positions on these issues.
Bush engages in prudent spending; his tax plans have succeeded; policies will decrease
the tax burden; fiscal policies will decrease national debt and/or deficit; policies have
restored investor and consumer confidence in the economy; economy has grown because
of tax policy. Bush’s fiscal policies will increase domestic prosperity. Bush’s spending
policies will increase educational opportunities; have led to excellence in educational
progress, standards, expectations, and/or reform, will provide more opportunities for
individuals to pursue an education. Bush’s social security policies will strengthen, harbor,
maintain, modernize, fix, and/or reduce risks towards and safeguard social security.
Bush’s policies have helped to lead to record growth in home sales; opportunities to
purchase and/or stay in homes. Kerry will increase tax burden; fiscal policies will lessen
investor and consumer confidence in the economy; fiscal policies will increase national
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debt and/or deficit; fiscal policies will be a disaster for the economy, country, and its
people; fiscal policy will make the cost of living unaffordable. Kerry’s fiscal policies
will decrease domestic prosperity. Kerry’s policies will hurt, harm, damage, increase the
risks of, and/or bankrupt social security. Kerry’s policies will decrease educational
opportunities, lead to a decline in educational progress, expectations, standards, and
or/reforms, will provide less opportunities for individuals to pursue an education.
Kerry’s policies will lead to a decline in home ownership; opportunities to purchase
and/or stay in homes.
Pro Kerry Government Spending/Services Frame – Consists of explicit support for
Kerry’s policies concerning the budget, fiscal policy such as taxes and the budget deficit,
housing, education, and social security and explicit rejection of Bush’s position on these
issues. President Bush engages in wasteful spending; his tax plan has failed; policies
have increased the tax burden; fiscal policies have led to an increase in economic
inequality; fiscal policy will increase the national debt and/or deficit; fiscal policy will
lessen investor and consumer confidence in the economy; fiscal policies will be a disaster
for the economy, country, and it people. Bush’s fiscal policies will decrease domestic
prosperity. Bush underfunds education; his policies will provide less opportunity for
individuals to pursue and education, lead to a decline in educational progress,
expectations, standards, and/or reforms, will provide less opportunities for individuals to
pursue an education. Bush’s policies will lead to disastrous outcomes for social security;
will bankrupt, increase risks towards, harm, hurt, damage social security. Bush’s
policies will lead to a decline in home ownership; opportunities to purchase and/or stay in
homes. Kerry will engage in fiscal discipline and restore fiscal responsibility. Kerry will
decrease the tax burden; fiscal policies will increase investor and consumer confidence in
the economy; fiscal policies will decrease the national debt and deficit; fiscal policies will
make the cost of living affordable. Kerry’s fiscal policies will increase domestic
prosperity. Kerry’s spending policies will increase educational opportunities; have led to
excellence in educational progress, standards, expectations, and/or reform, will provide
more opportunities for individuals to pursue an education. Kerry’s policies will protect,
safeguard, harbor, maintain, fix, decrease risk towards, and/or modernize social security.
Kerry’s policies will lead to an increase in home ownership; opportunities to purchase
and/or stay in homes.
Pro Bush Health Care Frame – Consists of explicit support for Bush’s policies
concerning health care and explicit rejection of Kerry’s positions on these issues. Kerry
opposes innovation in health care that will help cut down on consumer costs; might
impose health care policies that increase the national debt. Kerry’s health plan is too
ambitious; does not take into account tort reforms which might not effectively control
lawsuits; does not accurately add up costs associated with health care policies; will have
poor relationship with members of Congress on health care related issues. President Bush
supports expanded opportunity in health care policy, offers a dramatic, better choice to
health care reform in comparison to Kerry, and has dramatically different and better
options to health care from Kerry; offers more options in insurance coverage based on
policies adopted or will adopt in comparison to Kerry. Bush has lived up to his campaign

102

promises to deliver affordable health care to all segments of the population; has expanded
health care to underinsured sectors of the population; Bush’s health care plans will raise
costs to health care less than will Kerry’s; will adopt tort reforms necessary to control
lawsuits which will curb health care costs.
Pro Kerry Health Care Frame – Consists of explicit support for Kerry’s policies
concerning health care and explicit rejection of Bush’s positions on these issues. Kerry
offers innovative reforms for health care, offers a better choice to health care in
comparison to Bush. Kerry will expand health care coverage to focus on underinsured
segments of population. Kerry will help to keep health care costs low, affordable; for all
segments, underinsured segments of the population. Bush has offered no concrete
proposals for health care reform, has failed to provide good, quality, substantive health
care for Americans or a subset of the population that is presently underinsured; health
care polices not working for the American family; the number of uninsured has
increased; has failed to accurately calculate the costs associated with previous health care
proposals adopted. Bush has made little to no progress on health care related issues, will
not make progress on such issues if reelected; health care proposals are not innovative or
ambitious enough. Has poor working relationship with Congress on health care related
issues. Bush’s policies cater to high income Americans at the expense of low-income
Americans; will do a below average to poor job in cutting health care costs.
Pro Bush Job Growth Frame – Consists of explicit support for Bush’s policies
concerning job growth and explicit rejection of Kerry’s position on these issues. Frame
highlights positive job growth during Bush’s tenure in office shortly before 2004
presidential election, falling unemployment levels prior to 2004 election.
Pro Kerry Job Growth Frame - Consists of explicit support for Bush’s policies
concerning job growth and explicit rejection of Kerry’s position on these issues. Bush’s
record on the economy is highlighted by his net loss of jobs since attaining the presidency
in 2000 which cannot be compensated by recent net gain in job creation.
Measurement of Variables
The wordings for the 2004 ANES post-election and pre-election survey values are
presented below.
Anti-Terrorism
V45107 US Foreign Policy Goal: Combat International Terrorism
Very Important Goal (1)
Somewhat Important Goal (.5)
Not an Important Goal (0)
Iraq
V045125 Interventionism by diplomacy/military: importance
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Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not Too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)
Government Spending/Services
VO43137 Importance of Spending/Social Services to R
Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)
Health Care
VO43151 Importance of Government Health Insurance to R
Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)
Job Growth
VO43153 Importance of Guaranteed Job and Standard of Living Issue
Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)
Ideology
VO43086 R self-placement liberal-conservative
Liberal (1)
Moderate (.5)
Conservative (0)

Party Identification
VO45257 Like/dislike scale Democratic Party
VO45258 Like/dislike scale Republican Party
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If score associated with Democratic Party is higher than Republican Party (1)
If score of Democratic Party is same as Republican Party (.5)
If score associated with Republican Party is higher than Democratic Party (0)
Religion
VO43220 Religion provides some guidance in day to day living
A great deal of guidance (1)
Quite a bit of guidance (1)
Some guidance (.5)
Religion is not important (0)
Class
VO43298 Summary: Subjective Social Class
Upper class (1)
Upper middle class (1)
Middle class (.5)
Average middle class (0)
Working class (0)
Average working class (0)
Lower class (0)
Gender
VO43411 R: Gender
Male (1)
Female (0)
Race
VO43299A Race of Respondent
White (no mention of other race) (1)
Black (0)
Asian (0)
Native American (0)
Hispanic (0)
Other (0)
Age
VO 43250 Summary: Respondent Age
68-above (1)
43-67 (.5)
18-42 (0)
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Education
VO43254 Summary: Respondent Education Level
Advanced degree (1)
BA level degrees, no advanced degree (1)
Junior or community college level degrees (1)
More than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree (.5)
High school diploma or equivalency 3 (0)
9-11 grades and no further schooling (including 12 years without diploma or
equivalency) (0)
8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalency (0)
Political Knowledge
VO 45162: Political Office Recognition: Dennis Hastert
VO 45165 Political Office Recognition: William Rehnquist
Correctly identifies Hastert as Speaker of the House of Representatives and Rehnquist as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (1)
Correctly identifies either Hastert as Speaker of the House of Representatives or
Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, but not both (.5)
Does not either correctly identify Hastert as either the Speaker of the House or Rehnquist
as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In addition, does not attempt to guess. (0)
Newspaper
VO 43022 Attention to Newspaper Articles
A great deal (1)
Quite a bit (1)
Some (.5)
Very Little (0)
None (0)
TV News
VO 43015 Attention to National (Network) News
A great deal (1)
Quite a bit (1)
Some (.5)
Very Little (0)
None (0)
Attentive
Attentive: If Newspaper and/or TV News is 1 (1)
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Non-Attentive: If both Newspaper and TV News is less than 1. If Newspaper is less than
1 and there is no observation for TV News or if TV News is less than 1 and there is no
observation for Newspaper.
Vote Choice
VO 45026 Voter: R’s Vote for President
John Kerry (1)
George Bush (0)
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Examples of Pro-Bush Frame
Anti-Terrorism Frame
“‘This is not an enemy that can be negotiated with or reasoned with or appeased.’, Mr.
Cheney said, ‘This is, to put it simply, an enemy that must be destroyed, and with George
Bush as our commander in chief, that is exactly what we’re going to do.’” (Lyman, Rick.
2004. “Cheney Says Kerry Suffers ‘Fundamental Misunderstanding.’” New York Times,
September 4, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/04/politics/campaign/04cheney.html (accessed on
October, 15, 2009).
Iraq War Frame
“We are committed to winning this war on all fronts, and we are making impressive
gains.” (Franks, Tommy. 2004. “War of Words.” New York Times, October 19, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/opinion/19franks.html (accessed on September 18,
2009).
“Iraq is led by a free government made up of its own citizens. By the end of this year,
NATO and American forces will have trained 125,000 Iraqis to enforce the law, fight
insurgents, and secure borders. This is in addition to the great humanitarian progress
already achieved in Iraq.” (Franks, Tommy. 2004. “War of Words.” New York Times,
October 19, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/opinion/19franks.html (accessed
on October 26, 2009).
Government Spending/Services Frame
“No wait a minute, wait a minute – to be fair, there are some things my opponent is for.
He’s proposed more than $2 trillion on federal spending so far, and that’s a lot, even for a
senator from Massachusetts. And to pay for that spending, he is running on a platform of
increasing taxes, and that’s the kind of promise a politician usually keeps. His taxes – his
policies of tax and spend, of expanding government rather than expanding opportunity,
are the politics of the past.” (President George W. Bush. 2004. “Full Text of President
Bush’s Remarks.” New York Times, September 2, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/02/politics/campaign/03TEXTBUSH.html?pagewanted=print&position (accessed on October 28, 2009).
Health Care Frame
“These changing times can be exciting times of expanded opportunity. And here, you
face a choice. My opponent’s policies are dramatically different from ours. Senator
Kerry opposed medicare reform and health savings accounts.” (President George W.
Bush. 2004. “Full Text of President Bush’s Remarks.” New York Times, September 2,
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2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/02/politics/campaign/03TEXTBUSH.html?pagewanted=print&position (accessed on October 28, 2009).
Job Growth Frame
“In his remarks on the economy, Mr. Bush cast his economic record in a bright light: The
nation, he said, has enjoyed 12 straight months of job gains, adding 1.7 million jobs in the
past year, and seen the unemployment rate fall to 5.4 percent.” (Bumiller, Elisabeth.
2004. “Bush Attacks His Opponent Over His Record on Taxes.” New York Times,
September 10, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/politics/campaign/10bush.html
(accessed on October 8, 2009).
Examples of Pro-Kerry Frame
Anti-Terrorism
“Less than a week before the first presidential debate, Mr. Kerry took aim at what has
long been considered Mr. Bush's greatest political strength since 9/11 - the perception
that he would do a better job keeping the country safe from future attacks. In two fiery
speeches here, with widows from 9/11 and mothers of soldiers at his side, Mr. Kerry
dismissed that notion and argued that Mr. Bush's real record on fighting terrorism was a
catalogue of mistakes.” (Toner, Robin. 2004. “Kerry Promises to Refocus U.S. War on
Terror.” New York Times, September 25, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/25/politics/campaign/25kerry.html (accessed on
October 22, 2009).
Iraq War
“It’s hard to find a nonpartisan national security analyst with a good word for the Bush
administration’s foreign policy. Iraq, in particular, is a slow-motion disaster brought on
by wishful thinking, cronyism, and epic incompetence.” (Krugman, Paul. 2004. “A
Mythic Reality.” New York Times, September 7, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/07/opinion/07krugman.html (accessed on October 23,
2009).
Government Spending/Services
“‘Four years ago, we had a historic opportunity to shore up Social Security for years to
come, and George Bush squandered that opportunity.’” (Toner, Robin, and David
Rosenbaum. 2004. “Social Security Poses Hurdle for President.” New York Times,
September 18, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/18/politics/campaign/18social.html (accessed on
October 28, 2009).

109

Health Care
“‘Four years later, have we had a big fight with Congress that you can remember over
how we’re going to provide health care to all Americans? Can the president come to you
and say how much progress we’ve made, and that we’ve covered all the children in
America?’” (Halbfinger, David, and Richard W. Stevenson. 2004. “With Polls on the
Move, Bush and Kerry Take Their Economic Message to Ohio.” New York Times,
September 5, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/05/politics/campaign/05trail.html
(accessed on October 10, 2009).
Job Growth
“‘My friends at the rate this administration is creating jobs, you’re not going to have a net
plus of one job in the state of Ohio till the year 2011. I don’t think this is something to
celebrate, I think this is something to get to work on.’” (Halbfinger, David. 2004. “Kerry
Urges Voters to Look Past Bush’s ‘Last Minute Promises.’” New York Times, September
4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/04/politics/campaign/04kerry.html (accessed
on October 12, 2009).
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Chapter V
Conditional Limitations Associated with Framing Effects:
Experimental Analysis
Introduction
It is important to understand the interaction effects that might take place which
might confound the relationship between non-competitive and competitive frames on
individual public opinion. As I hypothesized in the last chapter, non-competitive frames
should polarize public opinion and competitive frames moderate public opinion.
However if we are to understand which factors influence public opinion more fully, we
should also examine factors which influence the direction of public opinion along with
factors which influence its intensity. By understanding how frames influence the
direction as well as the intensity of public opinion, we might have a better idea which
factors under which circumstances can be best described as conditional limitations of
framing effects.15
Framing Environment, Source, and Individual Predispositions
In short, I argue that in order to make predictions associated with the conditional
limitations of framing effects, it is important to examine the variance in framing
environment, source, and individual predisposition. In this chapter, I will examine two
factors associated with framing effects and their influence on personal opinion towards

15

Research on the conditional limitations of framing effects is extremely important given the nature of the
literatures which focus on the volatile nature of citizen opinion to subtle changes in the news media or
political speech (Zaller 1992). Druckman has repeatedly questioned these claims and has presented
considerable research illustrating the limitations of framing, most notably the impact of source credibility
on the nature of effect (Druckman 2001a, 2004b; Druckman and Nelson 2003).
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preventive war. First, I will examine factors which influence the direction of personal
opinion. Second, I will examine factors which influence the intensity of opinion.
What factors influence the direction of public opinion? All else being equal,
credible sources are more likely to gain support for a position they sponsor than noncredible sources. Therefore, we should expect that the State Department official is more
likely to be successful garnering support for or against preventive war than a comedian
might be. Second, individual predispositions or beliefs might influence the direction of
public opinion. By taking into account individual beliefs, predictions become more
complex and less straightforward. I posit that individuals who possess strong
predispositions for or against the use of force will be influenced by frames based on the
substance of information. Individuals who possess weak beliefs towards or against the
use of force are more likely to be influenced by frames based on who sponsors the frame.
What factors should influence the intensity of public opinion? The type of
framing environment should influence the intensity of public opinion. If information is
framed in a non-competitive in comparison to a competitive framing environment,
individuals will not be presented with both sides of the issue. Competitive framing
environments, therefore, have a tendency to moderate public opinion in contrast to noncompetitive framing environments.16 Non-competitive framing environments in contrast
to competitive framing environments have a tendency to polarize public opinion.

16

Framing studies often take a rather narrow view of the influence of frames on how citizens make sense of
politics and hence have measured the effects of only one frame at a time (Nelson et. al. 1997). However, in
day-to-day political discourse, citizens are likely to be exposed to competitive news messages. Hence it is
important to examine frames in both non-competitive and competitive contexts.
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In addition, the interaction between framing environment and individual
predisposition should influence the intensity of public opinion. In non-competitive
framing environments, those who possess weak initial opinions towards the use of force
are more likely to be dependent on the frame for shaping their views. This factor should
produce a strong framing effect. In contrast, those who possess strong initial opinions are
not likely to be highly dependent on the frame for shaping their views. This factor should
produce a weaker or moderate effect. This relationship might be different as it pertains to
competitive framing environments. For those who possess strong initial predispositions
in these circumstances, the degree of framing effect should be determined by the countereffects produced by the weaker frame. The degree of framing effect, therefore, might be
strong.17
In short, by taking into account individual predispositions, the relationship
between formation of public opinion, framing environment, and source is made more
complex. In addition, by taking into account framing environment, values, and individual
predispositions, we can make predictions not only involving the direction, but also the
intensity of the framing effect as well.18 Hence, the approach I adopt not only allows us

17

Research on competitive framing largely suggests that exposure to two opposing frames that invoke
different values dampens framing effects (Brewer 2002; Chong and Druckman 2007a; Wise and Brewer
2010). However, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) argue that competitive framing increases the influence of
personal beliefs in the process and thus decreases the effects of news framing. The increasing influence of
personal beliefs in the process suggests that we should further examine the nature of competitive frames on
the nature of the counter-effect.
18

In general, we know very little concerning the factors which determine the strength of the frame and thus
which factors might influence the intensity of the framing effect. Chong and Druckman (2007b) would
argue that frame strength depends on source credibility. In general, source credibility works based on the
theory of issue ownership. Credible sources establish their reputations based on the accumulated historical
evidence of their activities related to the issues in questions.
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to examine whether or not elites can gain support for preventive war, but how much
support they can gain for such an enterprise as well. Hypotheses three and four suggest
that framing effects are conditional. In other words, frames should significantly influence
public opinion in non-competitive framing environments for those who possess weak
initial opinions. In addition, frames should significantly influence public opinion in
competitive framing environments for those who possess strong initial opinions towards
the use of force.
In this chapter, I test the following hypotheses:
•

H1 (P3): In both non-competitive and competitive framing environments, those who
possess strong initial opinions towards the use of force are more likely to be
influenced in the direction of the frame that reflects individual beliefs and less likely
to be influenced by the frame that does not reflect individual beliefs.

•

H2 (P4): In non-competitive framing environments, those who possess weak initial
opinions towards the use of force are more likely to be influenced by the frame being
presented by the more credible source.

•

H3 (P5): In non-competitive framing environments, frames should influence
individuals who have strong initial opinions less than individuals who possess weak
initial opinions.

•

H4 (P6): In competitive framing environments, frames should influence individuals
who have strong initial opinions more than individuals who possess weak initial
opinions.

Experimental Overview
To enhance the external validity of the experiment, the scenario is based on a reallife foreign policy crisis. The experiment is based on the current US-Iranian crisis with
liberties taken to distinguish the fictional crisis from the actual real world event. There
are pros and cons to using fictional crises in experimental research. Even though we
sacrifice empirical validity by utilizing fictional crises in our scenarios, we avoid priming
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the subject to think in a certain way which can confound the manipulation of the
experiment. The goal of this experiment is to gauge the effects of framing on public
opinion in the context of preventive war in general, not simply to examine the effects of
framing in the context of specific preventive war scenarios such as Iran. In this case, by
utilizing a fictional scenario we increase the generalizeability of our findings to a plethora
of cases that can be grouped under threats to core national interests.
In the Iranian crisis, the cost of delay from a policy standpoint might embolden an
enemy that is not rational in nature. If Iran does acquire nuclear capabilities, it could be
emboldened to become a regional hegemon. If Iran becomes a regional hegemon, this
might lead to an arms race as other countries in the region might seek nuclear deterrents
of their own. At the same time, there could be substantial costs due to escalation if the
use of force against Iran is used. Iran has hardened and buried many of its nuclear
facilities in a way that may be difficult to destroy. Therefore, if the US were to go to war
with Iran, the military force needed to destroy these nuclear facilities may cause Iran to
retaliate thus forcing the US to escalate to push for full-blown regime change. The end
result may be unintended consequences inside and outside of Iran.
Method
Subjects
I recruited a total of 344 undergraduate students from political science courses at
a major Midwestern university. The participants were randomly selected to receive one
of six different experimental conditions. In four of these conditions, subjects received a
single frame (non-competitive situation) with either the US State Department official as
the credible source and a comedian as the non-credible source. In two of these
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conditions, a different set of subjects received competing frames with the US State
Department as the source of one frame and a comedian as the source of the other frame.
All participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine elite rhetoric and
its subsequent influence on foreign policy crises.
Design
In this study, a 3x2 between groups factorial design is employed. The two factors
are frame (costs of delay, costs of escalation, both) and source credibility (credible versus
noncredible). The conditions are as follows: a) delay-credible; b) escalate-credible; c)
both-credible; d) delay-noncredible; e) escalate-noncredible; and f) both-noncredible.
The Independent and Dependent Variables
The independent variables are the frame and source issuing each frame. These
constitute the makeup of the research instrument. The dependent variables of interest are
changes in overall opinion and underlying beliefs associated with conflict after the
presentation of the frame/frames. Before examining changes in overall opinion and
issues associated with belief importance, I ask questions establishing a baseline for
overall opinion. These questions are measured on a 10 point scale. If overall opinion is
strongly in favor of the use of force, scores should be closer to 10. If overall opinion is
strongly against the use of force, scores should be closer to 1. Individuals who possess
strong opinions towards the use of force will have scores ranging from 8 to 10 and
individuals who possess strong opinions against the use of force will have scores ranging
from 1 to 3. Scores ranging from 4 to 7 I define as weak opinion. Individuals who
possess weak opinions towards the use of force have scores ranging from 6 to 7 and
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individuals who possess weak opinions against the use of force have scores ranging from
4 to 5.
Changes in overall opinion and belief importance items are utilized to examine
the extent and nature of framing effects. Each of these questions measured on a 10-point
scale are given after the presentation of the frame. These questions are designed to find
out if the frame had any influence in terms of changes to overall opinion and belief
importance of respondents. I test for changes in overall opinion by simply inquiring how
strongly the subject is likely to support the use of force after the frame or set of frames
have been presented. In this regard, I measure changes in overall opinion based on
comparing responses before and after the presentation of the frame or set of frames.
Second, participants will be asked after the frame or frames are presented
questions related to belief importance. The subjects will be asked how important the
considerations brought up by the frame were in response to the question related to overall
opinion after the presentation of the frame. Scores closer to 10 indicate that the
considerations brought up by the frame were highly significant and closer to 1 if they
were not highly significant in influencing public opinion. The considerations associated
with measures of belief importance include “the costs of escalation,” “probability of the
crisis worsening,” “probability of US military victory,” “costs of delay,” “likelihood and
costs associated with a future war if diplomacy does not work” and “feasibility of
diplomatic alternatives.” Higher scores indicate a more positive response to the belief
importance measure.19

19

In the sample, mean scores and standard deviations associated with belief importance are as follows: a)
costs of delay 6.81 (2.06), b) costs of escalation 7.60 (1.83), c) feasibility of diplomacy 7.40 (2.23), d)
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Framing Effect
I measure a framing effect by taking into account the difference in overall opinion
before and after the frames have been presented. Hence, the framing effect takes into
account opinion movement. In non-competitive framing environments, we should see
less movement for individuals who possess strong initial opinions towards the use of
force than for individuals who possess weak initial opinions. In contrast, in competitive
framing environments we should see greater movement for individuals who possess
strong initial opinions towards the use of force than for individuals who possess weak
initial opinions. In addition, we should see significant movement based on source for
those who possess weak opinions towards the use of force.
The Research Instrument
Frames
The frames mention multiple considerations for the subjects to consider (Nelson,
Clawson, and Oxley 1997).20 However, the primary consideration of interest is the
potential costs associated with delay and the potential costs associated with crisis
probability of crisis worsening 5.75 (2.49), e) likelihood and costs of future war 6.63 (2.17), and f)
probability of military victory 7.06 (1.43).
20

In some framing experiments, the frame focuses exclusively on one consideration (Nelson, Oxley, and
Clawson 1997; Sniderman and Theriault 1999) while other frames mention multiple considerations, but
emphasize one as of primary importance (Druckman 2001a). My experiment focuses on the latter approach
and not the former. In addition, Entman (2004) would argue that the most inherently powerful frames are
those congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society. Hence, frames should
emphasize considerations that members of society are generally familiar with. Levy (1987) would argue
that preventive wars can be distinguished from non-preventive wars by the presence or absence of a power
shift. If this is the case, then pro-war frames in this context might be those that emphasize the costs of
delay. At the same time, scholars such as Van Evera (1999) have highlighted the nature of spiraling effects
as a result of conflict. Hence, a competing anti-war frame that might be inherently just as powerful might
emphasize the costs of escalation.
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escalation. In addition, the sources take an explicit position concerning whether they
support the use of force or not. People who use frames also emphasize what the proper
response to the crisis should take into account. The information associated with each of
these frames is based on work by Levy (1987). In the scenario, those who receive the
costs of delay frame will be told essentially that the costs of delay involve the possibility
that one’s position might continue to deteriorate as the enemy develops the technology
necessary to produce dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. In addition, they will be told that
it is unknown what the feasibility is of securing diplomatic support to contain the enemy
nor the likelihood and costs of future war if diplomacy fails to work. Those who receive
the costs of escalation frame will be told that victory is uncertain and there is a possibility
that escalation could take place from intervening third party states if they choose to use
force. This might make the present crisis worse rather than better.
In each of the frames, the credible source, the US State Department official, will
be described as having extensive knowledge in association with national security affairs
while maintaining access to classified military documents concerning the crisis. The
comedian, on the other hand, will be characterized as not having extensive knowledge in
regards to national security affairs or possess extensive access to classified military
documents concerning the crisis.
Framing Environment
Individuals are presented with one frame or two frames simultaneously.
Source of the Frame
The frame is presented either by a credible source, the US State Department
official or non-credible source, a comedian in the non-competitive framing environment.
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In the competitive framing environment, the US State Department official and comedian
present both sides of the debate simultaneously.
Procedure
After reading through the fictional scenario and told that their responses are
anonymous, participants are presented with a set of baseline questions asking them for
their overall opinion towards the use of force. Higher scores indicate more positive
responses to each of these measures.
After being presented with the baseline question, I presented each subject with
either a single frame (e.g. non-competitive framing situation emphasizing one major set
of considerations) or dual competing frames (competitive framing situation where
competing considerations are emphasized by the same source). The participants randomly
received one of the six statements – a statement put forth by a member of the US
Department of State focusing on the costs of escalation (n=60); a statement put forth by a
member of the US Department of State focusing on the costs of delay (n=54); a statement
put forth by a comedian focusing on the costs of escalation (n=57); a statement put forth
by a comedian focusing on the costs of delay (n= 57); a statement put forth by a member
of the US Department of State focusing on the costs of escalation and on the costs of
delay (n=58); and a statement put forth by a comedian focusing on the costs of escalation
and on the costs of delay (n=58).21 Afterwards, I then ask two sets of questions related to
changes in overall opinion and belief importance.
21

I conducted manipulation checks using ANOVA on each of the six experimental conditions. In each of
the non-competitive conditions, I calculated credibility based on questions involving a scale of 1 to 10 with
1 constituting that the source was not at all credible and 10 that the source was extremely credible: State
Department Escalation Frame 6.67; State Department Delay Frame 6.83; Comedian Escalation Frame 6.59;
and Comedian Delay Frame 5.79, F (3,217) = 2.28 p<.08. In the competitive conditions, I calculated the
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The last set of questions deal with idiosyncratic background orientation items.
The first set of variables here (individual risk propensity, need for cognitive closure,
isolationism/internationalism, and militant internationalism) serve as control variables
associated with framing effects. I measure risk propensity through a series of four
questions asking individuals to select either a risk averse or risky alternative pertaining to
various topics (e.g., recreational activities, mountain climbing, travelling, etc.). I
categorize individuals as risk acceptant if they select option A three out of four times and
risk averse if they select option B three out of four times. Individuals who select option
A twice and option B twice I categorize as neutral to risk.22 I measure individual need for
cognitive closure based on questions establishing individual need for order and structure
in the environment, comfortableness with ambiguity and open-ended judgments, and
possession of secure and stable knowledge. Each of these questions is measured on a 10point scale. Scores closer to 1 indicate a lower need for cognitive closure and scores
closer to 10 indicate a higher need for cognitive closure.
I measure isolationism/internationalism through a series of three questions asking
individuals for their views concerning US level of political and economic involvement in
world affairs, whether or not the US has a special role to play in world affairs, and
whether the US should have an active role in world affairs. Scores ranging from 1 to 5
will be classified as isolationist responses and 6 to 10 internationalist. I measure militant
internationalism by asking individuals whether they believe a strong military should be a

manipulation check using the same scale: State Department Competitive Frame 6.61; Comedian
Competitive Frame 5.72, F (1,115) = 4.65 p<.03.
22

In the sample, 42.2% can be defined as risk acceptant, 40.2% as risk averse, and 17.5% as risk neutral.
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high priority, what the role of the CIA in undermining hostile governments should be,
and whether or not the Iraq war was justified. 23
Finally, the second set of variables (e.g., voting behavior, political party behavior,
ideological predispositions, age, gender, race, educational level, and party ID) establishes
the demographic context for the study.24
Results
The data analysis focused specifically on determining if individuals such as the
US State Department official or comedian can engender support or opposition towards
the use of force based on the frames that are presented for public consumption.
Framing Effects on Support for Preventive War
Using the ANOVA statistical method, I tested for statistically significant main
and interaction effects on overall opinion towards the use of force. In presenting these
results, I run tests on the entire sample (n=344). In addition, I run tests on subsets of
respondents based on their initial support for the use of force; strongly support the use of
force (n=95), strongly oppose the use of force (n=48), weakly support the use of force
(n=130), and weakly oppose the use of force (n=71).
As reported in Table 4, I found a strong statistically significant main effect for
frame on those who weakly oppose the use of force, F (2,71) = 5.26, p<.008, costs of
23

In the sample, mean scores and standard deviations associated with cognitive closure, internationalism,
and militant internationalism are as follows: cognitive closure 4.62(2.94), internationalism 5.31(2.63), and
militant internationalism 5.37(2.73) Scores for individual questions related to each of these variables are
available upon request from the author.
24

In the sample, 45% were under the age of 20, 48% between the ages of 20-25, 4% between the ages of
26-30, 1% between the ages of 31-35, 1% between the ages of 41-45, and 1% over the age of 45. 57% of
the participants were male. 87% of the participants were white and 13% were non-white. Average
participant ideology was 5.0 (1=extremely liberal and 10 = extremely conservative). Lastly, 23% of the
participants identified themselves as Republicans, 38% Democrat, and 39% Independent.
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delay frame (M=4.78), costs of escalation frame (M=3.76), and competitive framing
environment (M=3.92). I found that respondent support for the decision to initiate
conflict was considerably less when individuals were presented with a frame emphasizing
the costs of escalation in comparison to either a costs of delay frame or a competitive
environment featuring both frames.

Sample

Weak Opposition

Table 4. Main Effect of Frame
Cost of Delay
Competitive Frame
Frame
4.78

3.92

Costs of Escalation
Frame
3.76

In addition, as reported in Table 5, I found a marginally statistically significant
main effect for source on those who weakly support the use of force, F (1,130) = 3.74,
p<.06, US State department official (M=5.71) and comedian (M=6.10). Support for the
use of force increased when the comedian was the source of information in comparison to
the US State Department official. In this case, the findings contradict the second
hypothesis which suggests that the US State Department official should have more
influence encouraging support for the use of force than the comedian for those who
weakly support conflict.

Sample
Weak Support

Table 5. Main Effect of Source
Comedian
US State Department
6.10
5.71

Afterwards, I ran ANOVA tests examining interaction effects. In Table 6, I
examine interaction effects for non-competitive framing environments. I present
results regarding the entire sample size. In addition, I also present statistically significant
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interaction effects for those who strongly support and weakly oppose the use of force.
First, I found a marginally statistically significant interaction effect for non-competitive
framing environment and source, F (3,228) =2.38, p<.07, State Department Escalation
Frame F (M=4.98), State Department Delay Frame (M=5.96), Comedian Escalation
Frame (M=5.71), Comedian Delay Frame (M=5.52). These findings indicate that
differences in overall opinion are dependent on the source sponsoring the frame. There is
a wider variation in overall opinion for frames issued by the credible source than for
those issued by the non-credible source. It is important to note, that overall opinion was
higher for State Department delay frames than for State Department escalation frames.
However, opinion towards the use of force is higher for the comedian escalation frame
than it is for the comedian delay frame.
Second, I also discovered statistically significant effects in regards to noncompetitive framing environments and source for those who strongly support the use of
force, F (3,63) = 3.21, p<.03, State Department Escalation Frame (M=6.26), State
Department Delay Frame (M=7.42), Comedian Escalation Frame (M=7.85), Comedian
Delay Frame (M=7.53).
Third, we see very strong statistically significant effects for individuals who
weakly oppose the use of force, F (3,48) = 5.45, p<.003, State Department escalation
frame (M = 3.25), State Department delay frame (M=4.85), comedian escalation frame
(M=4.36), and comedian delay frame (M=4.56).

124

Table 6. Interaction Effects of Source and Frame (Non-Competitive)
Sample
US State
US State
Comedian
Comedian
Department
Department
Escalation
Delay Frame
Escalation
Delay Frame
Frame
Frame
Everyone

4.98

5.96

5.71

5.52

Strong Support

6.26

7.42

7.85

7.53

Weak
Opposition

3.25

4.85

4.36

4.56

I also examine interaction effects for competitive framing environments. For
individuals who strongly supported the use of force, I found marginally statistically
significant interaction effects as reported in Table 7 in regards to competitive framing
environments and source, F (1,32) = 2.89, p<.10, comedian competitive framing
environment (M=7.21) and State Department official competitive framing environment
(M=8.07).
In addition to those who possess strong opinions, we see statistically significant
effects for individuals who weakly support the use of force in competitive environments,
F (1,43) = 4.50, p<.04, State Department competitive framing environment (M=5.95) and
comedian competitive framing environment (M=5.26).
In this case, it was the US State Department official which increased support for
the use of force and comedian who discouraged such support. In support for the second
hypothesis, those who weakly supported the use of force were more likely to buy into the
reasoning put forth by the state department official than comedian. However, those who
strongly supported the use of force were also more likely to buy into the use of force
based on information presented by the US State Department official than the comedian.
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Table 7. Interaction Effects of Source and Frame (Competitive)
Sample
US State Department
Comedian
Strong Support

8.07

7.21

Weak Support

5.95

5.26

However, in order to adequately test the hypotheses, it is important to compare
the difference in overall opinion towards the use of force before and after the framing
environments are presented. To do this, I run ANOVA tests examining opinion towards
the use of force before and after the non-competitive and competitive framing
environments are presented. In addition to examining all respondents, I also examine
subsets of respondents, specifically those who strongly support, strongly oppose, weakly
support, and weakly oppose the use of force. I present findings for the entire sample first
before presenting results associated with subsets of respondents.
As reported in Table 8, I found a marginally statistically significant effect for
respondents presented with the US State Department competitive frame, F (1, 58) = 3.37,
p<.07. Overall, opinion was higher before the competitive frame was presented by the
US State Department official (M=5.84) in comparison to after the competitive frame was
presented (M=5.03).
In addition, I also found a marginally statistically significant effect for
respondents presented with the comedian competitive frame, F (1, 58) = 3.54, p <.07.
Overall opinion was higher before the competitive frame was presented by the comedian
(M=6.36) in comparison to after the competitive frame was presented (M=5.66). In
neither case did the competitive framing environment serve as a moderating factor.
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Lastly, I found a strong statistically significant effect for individuals presented
with the US State Department escalation frame, F (1,60) = 9.57, p <.003. Overall opinion
was higher before the frame (M=6.12) in comparison to after the frame was presented
(M=4.98).
Table 8. Everyone
Before

After

US State Department
Competitive Frame

5.84

5.03

Comedian Competitive
Frame

6.36

5.66

US State Department
Escalation Frame

6.12

4.98

Framing Environment

Afterwards, I examine the relationship for those who possess strong and weak
opinions towards and against the use of force. For those who strongly support the use of
force, I hypothesize that opinion towards the use of force should be higher after the
presentation of the non-competitive frame featuring the costs of delay. There should be
no effect when presented with the non-competitive costs of escalation frame. For those
who strongly oppose the use of force, I anticipate that opinion should be influenced
favorably by the costs of escalation frame. In particular, opinion towards the use of force
should be lower after this particular framing environment is presented rather than before.
In addition, I anticipate that there should be no effect when presented with the costs of
delay non-competitive frame. Furthermore, I anticipate that competitive frames should
have more influence on opinion than non-competitive frames for those who both strongly
support and oppose the use of force due to counter-effects produced by the perceived
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weaker frame. Competitive framing environments should encourage support towards the
use of force for those who have strong initial opinions and discourage support for the use
of force for those who have strong initial opinions against such activity.
For those who weakly support and oppose the use of force, I anticipate that
framing environments should only be influential if sponsored by a credible source. In
this context, the costs of escalation should discourage support for the use of force and
costs of delay encourage support only if sponsored by a credible source. Furthermore,
non-competitive framing environments should have more impact on overall opinion than
competitive framing environments.
In Table 9, I present results for individuals who strongly support the use of force.
First, I found a statistically significant effect for individuals who strongly support the use
of force regarding competitive frames presented by the state department official, F (1,13)
=5.23, p<.04. Overall opinion was higher before the competitive frame featuring the
state department official (M=9.15) in comparison to after (M=8.08). In addition, I found
a strong statistically significant effect for individuals who are presented with the
comedian competitive frame, F (1, 19) = 12.36, p< .002. Overall opinion was higher
before the competitive frame featuring the comedian (M=8.52) than after (M=7.21).
Once again support for the use of force considerably decreased after being presented with
the competitive frame.
Moreover, I found a marginally significant effect for individuals who were
presented with the comedian delay frame, F (1,17) = 4.09, p <.06. Overall opinion was
higher before the non-competitive frame sponsored by the comedian was presented
(M=8.52) than after (7.52). Furthermore, I found a strong significant effect for
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individuals presented with the state department costs of delay frame, F (1,15) = 8.51, p
<.007. In this case, the overall opinion of respondents decreased significantly after being
presented with a non-competitive frame sponsored by the state department official
focusing on the costs of delay. Overall opinion before the frame was presented was much
higher (M=8.27) than after (7.40). Lastly, I found a strong statistically significant effect
for individuals presented with the costs of escalation frame sponsored by the state
department official, F (1,18) = 26.48, p <.001. In this case, overall opinion was higher
before the non-competitive frame sponsored by the state department official emphasizing
the costs of escalation (M=8.20) than after (M=6.20).
In short, these cumulative results indicate that because an opinion is strongly held
does not necessarily mean that it is firmly held and thus unable to change. However, it
should be noted in most cases that opinion still strongly supported the use of force after
the frame was presented. Still, opinion towards the use of force decreased in all cases
regardless of source and frame. These results do not lend support to the first hypothesis,
which suggests that opinion towards the use of force should increase after being
presented with noncompetitive and competitive frames.
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Table 9. Strongly Support
Before

After

US State Department
Competitive Frame

9.15

8.08

Comedian Competitive
Frame

8.52

7.21

Comedian Delay Frame

8.52

7.52

US State Department Delay
Frame

8.27

7.40

US State Department
Escalation Frame

8.20

6.20

Framing Environment

In addition, I find statistically significant results for those who weakly support
and oppose the use of force. In short, I hypothesize that statistically significant effects
should be based on source. In addition, I hypothesize that non-competitive framing
environments should have more of an impact on overall opinion than competitive frames.
However, as was the case for those who strongly supported the use of force,
competitive frames influenced opinion towards the use of force. In Table 10, I found a
strong statistically significant effect for individuals who were presented with the US State
Department competitive frame, F (1,19) = 16.81, p<.0003. In the first case, support for
the use of force was higher before the competitive frame sponsored by the state
department official (M=6.63) than after (M=5.26). Similarly, I found a statistically
significant effect for individuals presented with the comedian competitive frame, F (1,24)
= 6.17, p<.02. In the second case, support for the use of force was also higher (M=6.42)
before the competitive frame sponsored by the comedian than after (M=5.96).
In addition, I also found statistically significant effects for select
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non-competitive frames as well. I found a statistically significant effect for individuals
presented with the comedian costs of delay frame, F (1,18) = 4.91, p<.04. Support for the
use of force was higher before the non-competitive frame (M=6.68) sponsored by the
comedian emphasizing the costs of delay than after (M=6.05). Moreover, I also found
statistically significant interaction effects for frames sponsored by credible sources as
well. I found a strong statistically significant interaction effect for individuals presented
with the escalation frame sponsored by the state department official, F (1, 21) = 11.76, p<
.002. Support for the use of force was higher before the non-competitive frame (M=6.57)
sponsored by the comedian emphasizing the costs of escalation than after (M=5.57).
Table 10. Weakly Support
Before

After

US State Department
Competitive Frame

6.63

5.26

Comedian Competitive
Frame

6.42

5.96

Comedian Delay Frame

6.68

6.05

US State Department
Escalation Frame

6.57

5.57

Finally, as reported in Table 11, I found a strong statistically significant effect for
frames sponsored by the US State Department official for those who weakly oppose the
use of force, F (1,12) = 10.71, p<.004. Support for the use of force was higher before the
non-competitive frame (M=4.50) sponsored by the state department official emphasizing
the costs of escalation than after (M=3.25).
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US State Department
Escalation Frame

Table 11. Weakly Oppose
Before

After

4.50

3.25

Table 11 provides support for the second hypothesis which suggests that the
impact of source and frame should encourage opposition against the use of force for those
who have weak opinions.
Conclusion
Framing effects are viewed as evidence that elites are able to manipulate citizens
who uncritically accept whatever frame they are presented with (Entman 1993; Riker
1986). The results here demonstrate that this might necessarily be the case. In addition,
there was little systematic relationship between strength of overall opinion towards the
use of force and propensity to buy into frames as I hypothesized.
First, there was little relationship between those who possessed strong opinions
towards or against the use of force and direction of the framing effect. Those individuals
who possessed strong opinions supporting the use of force were consistently less inclined
to engage in support for such endeavors after presentation of the framing environment.
This finding took place regardless if the framing environment was competitive or noncompetitive. In addition, this finding took place regardless of the considerations
emphasized by the frame. In addition, there was no statistically significant relationship
between those who strongly opposed the use of force and direction of framing effect. As
a result, the first hypothesis is not supported.
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Second, the relationship between source and framing effect is inconsistent.
Findings largely do not support the second hypothesis for those who weakly support the
use of force. Support for the use of force decreased regardless of source if we compare
overall opinion before and after the presentation of the framing environment. In addition,
findings are mixed regarding which source is more successful in encouraging support for
the use of force if we compare the two together. Findings are more supportive for those
who possess weak overall opinions against the use of force. These findings are supported
by analyzing opinions both in comparing framing environments to each other as well as
analyzing overall opinion levels before and after particular framing environments were
presented for specific experimental conditions. If we compare opinion before and after
the presentation of frames, support decreased for the use of force as hypothesized. In
addition, there is wider variation in scores if we compare distinct non-competitive frames
sponsored by the credible source than if we compare distinct non-competitive frames
sponsored by the non-credible source. Because of this, the second hypothesis is partially
supported.
Finally, the third and fourth hypotheses found little support. Support for the third
hypothesis does not exist given the fact that non-competitive frames influenced
individuals who have strong opinions as much as for those who possessed weak opinions.
In addition, I fail to find support for the fourth hypothesis which suggests that
competitive frames should influence those who have strong opinions more than
individuals who possess weak opinions.
Future work can build on the results in a few directions. Given the fact that
strength of opinion was not an adequate predictor of framing effect, other variables
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should be considered. Future research should perhaps consider the impact of framing
effects on individuals who possess different propensities to accept risk or different
propensities towards cognitive closure. As Druckman (2004a) points out, individuals who
are neutral towards risk are more likely to be susceptible to framing effects because prior
opinions are not strong in either direction. In addition, it might be fruitful to consider the
impact of cognitive closure (Zuckerman 1994). As Webster and Kruglanski (1994),
Zuckerman (1994), and Federico, Golec, and Dial (2005) suggest, those with a high need
for cognitive closure are more likely to base opinions on peripheral cues or adopt
heuristics because they feel uncomfortable in environments characterized by
informational uncertainty. Individuals, however, who have low need for cognitive
closure, are likely to process information more thoroughly and thus might be less
susceptible to buy into frames simply based on their peripheral cues.
In addition to cognitive closure and risk, we can examine other moderators as
well. As Druckman (2004b) points out, interpersonal communication might also serve as
a moderator of framing effects. Hence, we should perhaps consider the influence of
interpersonal communication on the efficacy of the framing effect (Mendelburg 2002).
As Morrow (1994) and Wittman (1995) point out, participants can introduce alternative
frames into consideration. Hence we need to ask whether interpersonal communication
enhances framing effects or whether it mitigates against them. Furthermore, we can also
investigate the nature of the discussion group (e.g., homogenous, heterogeneous groups)
and its impact on the framing effect (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Visser and Mirabile
2003). Indeed homogenous groups might enhance the nature of the framing effect on
participants and heterogenous groups lessen the impact of frames. An important question
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that might be asked concerns the nature of discussion groups and multiple framing
environments. By attempting to understand the nexus between group and framing
environment we will be a step closer to developing a coherent theory of the framing
effect. Finally, more work needs to be done in perhaps articulating a coherent theory of
framing to account for differences in preemptive versus preventive wars. Preemptive
wars take place in environments where the threat posed by the adversary is highly visible
and imminent whereas preventive wars address conflicts that take place when the
adversary presents a vague or perhaps long-term threat. Framing preventive conflict
might present a difficult test in comparison to preemptive conflict.
More generally, the results presented here fit in with research on political
communication. Work on mass communication, as Druckman (2001a) has pointed out,
has focused on the indirect effects of mass communication (e.g., agenda setting, priming,
and framing). My findings fail to confirm past research that frames work through
deliberative processes where people seek guidance from sources they believe to be
credible (Druckman 2001a; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley
1997). However, more work needs to be done in addressing other possible variables as
potential moderators on framing effects, in particular as they pertain to marketing uses of
force given the real world ramifications of such empirical research.
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Appendix B: Research Instrument
Experimental Scenario One
Various pundits, scholars and media personalities have weighed in on the situation in
Bajikistan, a small country run by an Islamic government. Bajikistan is an adversary of the US.
As is readily known, Bajikistan is said to possess eight operational uranium mines and a nuclear
reactor, which it claims is being used for peaceful purposes. However, Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) intelligence reports have indicated that Bajikistan has been reprocessing spent fuel
from the reactor into nuclear weapons grade material. As a result, it is believed that Bajikistan
could produce a nuclear weapon within two years and a “dirty bomb” within a few months. A
“dirty bomb” combines a conventional explosive such as dynamite with radioactive material that
scatters when the bomb goes off. The bomb can kill or injure through the blast of the
conventional explosive and by airborne contamination from the radioactive material. Such
bombs can be as small as miniature devices or as large as a truck bomb. The goal of any military
campaign if it were launched, according to the DIA, would be to take out the nuclear reactor and
development facilities around the country followed by the use of ground troops to seal off the
uranium mines. Victory, according to the DIA, would be achieved if the nuclear reactor in the
country is destroyed and ground troops have effectively sealed off all eight uranium mines.
Overall opinion
1) Taken into account what you have just read, would you support the decision to use force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly
oppose
decision

9

10
Strongly
support
the decision

Non-competitive condition
Costs Associated with Delay Frame
[US State Department official Ralph Wilson] OR [Comedian Wayne Scott] supports the
use of force. [Wilson has extensive background in US national security related matters and has
access to classified military documents concerning this crisis] OR [Scott does not have an
extensive background in US national security related matters nor does he have access to classified
military documents concerning this crisis]. He believes that there are uncertainties regarding
whether or not one’s position will continue to deteriorate in comparison to Bajikistan if a
response to the crisis is delayed. According to [Wilson] OR [Scott], it is unknown how much
more formidable of a foe Bajikistan will be if it develops the technology necessary to produce
dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, [Wilson] OR [Scott] suggest that it is unknown
what the feasibility is of securing diplomatic support to actually contain and/or appease Bajikistan
or to know the likelihood and costs of a future war if diplomacy were not to work in appeasing
Bajikistan.
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OR
Costs Associated with Crisis Escalation Frame
[US State Department official Ralph Wilson] OR [Comedian Wayne Scott] does not
support the use of force. [Wilson has extensive background in US national security related
matters and has access to classified military documents concerning this crisis] OR [Scott does not
have an extensive background in US national security related matters nor does he have access to
classified military documents concerning this crisis]. He believes that even though there is a
greater than 50% chance that victory may be achieved if conflict is initiated, there is still a chance
that the US may not succeed in its military goals and objectives. In addition, according to
[Wilson] OR [Scott], the US should consider the likelihood of escalation from intervening third
party states if they choose to use force which may make the present crisis worse rather than
better.
Overall opinion
2) After hearing the views of [Ralph Wilson] OR [Wayne Scott], would you support the decision
to use force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Strongly
oppose
decision

Strongly
support
decision

Belief Importance
3) How important do you consider [the potential costs associated with delay] OR [the potential
costs of escalation] in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at
all
important

10
Extremely
Important

4) How important do you consider [the feasibility of diplomatic alternatives] OR [the possibility
that the US may make the crisis worse if they opt to use force] in determining your support or
opposition to the use of force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at
Extremely
all
Important
important
5) How important do you consider [the likelihood and costs of a future war] OR [possibility that
the US may not achieve a victorious outcome] in determining your support or opposition to the
use of force?
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at
all
important

10
Extremely
Important

Background Information Questions
6) Each of the items below contains two choices A and B. Please circle which of the choices
most describes your likes or the way you feel. Please focus on your likes and feelings (and not
how others feel or how one is “supposed” to feel). There are no right or wrong answers.
A. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned or definite routes, or timetable.
B. When I go on a trip, I like to plan my route and timetable very carefully.
A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber.
B. I can’t understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains.
A. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means getting lost.
B. I prefer a map when I am in a place I don’t know well.
A. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.
B. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous.
7) I think that having clear order and rules at work is essential for success.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

8) I’d rather hear bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

9) I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.
1

2

Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Strongly
Agree
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10) I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what to expect from it
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

11) I usually do not consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

12) In general, I think it is wise for the US to avoid political or economic involvement with other
countries.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

13) The US must play an active role in world affairs
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

14) The US has a special role in world politics.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

15) A strong military should be a very high priority for the US.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

16) There is nothing wrong with using the CIA to undermine hostile governments.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

17) The Iraq War was justified.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

18) Age: (Under 20) (21-25)
19) Gender: (Male)

(Female)

(26-30)

(31-35)

(36-40)

(41-45)

(46 and above)
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20) Race: (White) (Black) (Hispanic) (Asian) (Pacific Islander)
(Native American) (Black and Asian) (Black and Native American)
(Black and Hispanic) (Black and White) (Asian and Native American)
(Asian and Hispanic) (Asian and White) (Native American and Hispanic)
(Native American and White) (Hispanic and White) (Other)
21) Education Level: (High School or less) (Some College) (College Degree) (Advanced Degree)

22) What position on the ideological spectrum best represents your political views?
Extremely 1
Liberal

2 3

4 5

6

7 8

9 10

Extremely
Conservative

23) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or
what? Write down your answer on the line below.
____________
Manipulation Check
24) How credible was the source passing along the information?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Not at all
Credible

9

10
Extremely
Credible

25) Do you consider the environment in which the information was presented to be noncompetitive or competitive in nature?
Competitive
Non-Competitive
Competitive Condition
[US State Department official Ralph Wilson] OR [Comedian Wayne Scott] suggests
based on research done that we need to consider both the costs of delay and costs of escalation
regarding the use of force. [Wilson has an extensive background in national security related
matters and he has access to classified military documents concerning these matters] OR [Scott
does not have an extensive background in national security related matters and he does not have
access to classified military documents concerning these matters]. He believes that there are
uncertainties regarding whether or not one’s position will continue to deteriorate in comparison to
Bajikistan if a response to the crisis is delayed. According to [Wilson] OR [Scott] it is unknown
how much more formidable of a foe Bajikistan will be if it develops the technology necessary to
produce dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, [Wilson] OR [Scott] suggests that it is
unknown what the feasibility is of securing diplomatic support to actually contain and/or appease
Bajikistan or to know the likelihood and costs of a future war if diplomacy were not to work in
appeasing Bajikistan.
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At the same, [Wilson] OR [Scott] suggests that even though there is a 50% chance that
victory may be achieved if conflict is initiated, there is still a chance that the US may not succeed
in its military goals and objectives. In addition, according to [Wilson] OR [Scott] the US should
consider the likelihood of escalation from intervening third party states if they choose to use force
which may make the present crisis worse rather than better.
Overall Opinion
2) After hearing the views of [Wilson] or [Scott], would you support the decision to use force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
oppose
the decision

10
Strongly
support the decision

Belief Importance
3) How important do you consider the potential costs of delay in determining your support or
opposition to the use of force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at
all
important

10
Extremely
Important

4) How important do you consider the potential costs of escalation in determining your support or
opposition to the use of force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at
all
important

10
Extremely
Important

5) How important do you consider the feasibility of diplomatic alternatives in determining your
support or opposition to the use of force?
1

2

Not at
all
important

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Extremely
Important
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6) How important do you consider the possibility that the use of force may make the crisis worse
in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at
all
important

10
Extremely
Important

7) How important do you consider the likelihood and costs of a future war in determining your
support or opposition to the use of force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at
all
important

10
Extremely
Important

8) How important do you consider the possibility that the US may not achieve a victorious
outcome in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Not at
all
important

9

10
Extremely
Important

Background information questions
9) Each of the items below contains two choices A and B. Please circle which of the choices
most describes your likes or the way you feel. Please focus on your likes and feelings (and not
how others feel or how one is “supposed” to feel). There are no right or wrong answers.
1. A. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned or definite routes, or timetable.
B. When I go on a trip, I like to plan my route and timetable very carefully.
2. A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber.
B. I can’t understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains.
3. A. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means getting lost.
B. I prefer a map when I am in a place I don’t know well.
4. A. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.
B. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous.
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10) I think that having clear order and rules at work is essential for success.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

11) I’d rather hear bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

12) I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

13) I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what to expect from it
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

10
Strongly
Agree

14) I usually do not consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly
Disagree

9

10
Strongly
Agree

15) In general, I think it is wise for the US to avoid political or economic involvement with other
countries.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

16) The US must play an active role in world affairs
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree
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17) The US has a special role in world politics.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

18) A strong military should be a very high priority for the US.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

19) There is nothing wrong with using the CIA to undermine hostile governments.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

7

8 9

10

Strongly
Agree

20) The Iraq War was justified.
Strongly 1
Disagree

2 3

4 5 6

21) Age: (Under 20) (21-25)
22) Gender: (Male)

(26-30)

(31-35)

(36-40)

(41-45)

(46 and above)

(Female)

23) Race: (White) (Black) (Hispanic) (Asian) (Pacific Islander)
(Native American) (Black and Asian) (Black and Native American)
(Black and Hispanic) (Black and White) (Asian and Native American)
(Asian and Hispanic) (Asian and White) (Native American and Hispanic)
(Native American and White) (Hispanic and White) (Other)
24) Education Level: Education Level: (High School or less) (Some College) (College Degree)
(Advanced Degree)
25) What position on the ideological spectrum best represents your political views?
Extremely 1
Liberal

2 3

4 5

6

7 8

9 10

Extremely
Conservative

26) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or
what? Write down your answer on the line below.
____________
Manipulation Check
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27) How credible was the source passing along the information?
1

2

3

Not at all
Credible

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Extremely
Credible

28) Do you consider the environment in which the information was presented to be noncompetitive or competitive in nature?
Competitive
Non-Competitive
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Conclusion
This study was designed to explore how frames work to influence public opinion
for or against preventive war. This dissertation has examined how the nature of the
framing environment, source, and initial predisposition interact to explain how elites are
able to use frames to influence public opinion. Namely this study sought to answer the
following questions:
a) Do non-competitive frames influence public opinion? Do competitive frames
moderate public opinion?
b) How do non-competitive and competitive frames influence public opinion for
those who initially possess strong opinions towards the use of force in comparison to
those who initially possess weak opinions towards the use of force?
Empirical Findings
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the
respective empirical chapters. This section will synthesize the empirical findings that
address the study’s two research questions.
Non-Competitive Versus Competitive Framing Effects
The first empirical chapter illustrated the impact that non-competitive and
competitive frames had on overall opinion. The major question I explored was whether
non-competitive frames influenced public opinion and competitive frames moderated
such opinion. In this chapter, I explored the relationship between framing and voting
behavior in regards to the 2004 US presidential election pitting George W. Bush against
John Kerry. I conducted content analysis on one major newspaper, the New York Times,
from the first day after the end of the Republican Convention (September 8, 2004) to the
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day of the presidential election, November 2, 2004. I wanted to determine whether
individuals that were exposed to political information from the newspaper determined
their vote choice based on frames the newspaper focused on the most. In addition, I
wanted to discover whether these findings were statistically different from individuals
who did not pay attention to the 2004 US presidential election. I hypothesized that
competitive frames were not significantly likely to influence vote choice whereas noncompetitive frames, on the other hand, would influence voting behavior in favor of one
candidate over another. Non-competitive frames were frames that supported one
candidate approximately 67% of the time or more on the issue whereas competitive
frames supported a given candidate less than 67%. Non-competitive frames in this study
were strongly pro-Kerry (e.g., Iraq, health care, and job growth).

There were two

competitive frames in this study, one pro-Bush (e.g., the anti-terrorism issue) and the
other, pro-Kerry (government spending). I hypothesized that as attentive people attached
greater importance to the non-competitive issues, the more likely they were to vote for
John Kerry. However, I hypothesized that access to competitive frames for attentive
people would moderate vote choice.
Overall, non-competitive frames had minimal effect in influencing voting
behavior through exposure. As each of the non-competitive issues grew in importance,
individuals were neither more nor less likely to vote for one candidate over another. Of
the two competitive frames that were considered in this election, one particular frame had
a significant impact on voting behavior (e.g., the anti-terrorism frame). The anti-terrorism
frame was highly salient given the fact that the 2004 election was largely viewed as a
referendum on 9-11. As people placed more importance on the issue, they were likely to
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vote more for George Bush and less for John Kerry. However, individuals who were
attentive and not attentive were both likely to consider the anti-terrorism issue as
important in determining their vote choice for President Bush. In particular, it was
exposure to both the TV and newspaper and/or exposure to TV viewership alone that
significantly influenced vote choice in regards to the anti-terrorism issue. Access to the
newspaper alone did not significantly influence vote choice in regards to this issue.
Conditional Limitations Associated with Framing Effects: Experimental Analysis
In the second chapter, I examined how non-competitive and competitive frames
influenced public opinion. In particular, I wanted to see if the relationship between
framing environment and overall opinion would be moderated by frame source and initial
opinion. I hypothesized that individuals who possessed initially strong opinions towards
the use of force would be influenced by frames based on central cues such as
informational substance and individuals who possessed initially weak opinions would be
influenced by frames based on peripheral cues such as source.
In general, regardless of intensity of initial opinion, the credibility of the source or
the strength of initial opinion failed to serve as a limitation or enhancement on the
framing effect. These findings contradict research which suggests that individuals
delegate to credible sources because they are competent and trustworthy in nature
(Druckman 2001a; Grewal, Gotlieb and Mammorstein 1994; Heesacker, Petty, and
Cacioppo 1983; Horai, Naccari and Fatuollah 1974; Hovland and Weiss 1951; Lirtzman
and Shuv-Ami 1986).

In addition, I also examined hypothesis which attempted to

address the relationship between framing environment and intensity of initial opinion. I
predicted that non-competitive environments would have less effect on those who
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possessed strong overall opinions in comparison to those who possessed weak opinions
and that competitive framing environments would have a better chance of possessing a
moderating influence for those who possessed weak initial opinions than those who
possessed strong initial opinions. In short, these hypotheses were not upheld.
Recommendations for Future Research
Based on this dissertation, I believe that future research integrating framing
effects, public opinion, and the use of force can proceed in the following direction.
Relationship between Framing Environment and Other Moderators
We should strive to see if there is a relationship between source credibility and
need for cognitive closure. Hence, individuals who possess a high need for such closure
might be more likely to buy into frames based on source than individuals who possessed
a low need for such closure. Prior research has examined the importance that cognitive
style might play in proclivity towards nuanced thought and information processing
(Crowson, Debacker, and Thoma 2006; Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005; Holbert and
Hanson 2006; Le Boeuf and Shafir 2003; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes and O’Brien 1995).
The relationship between framing effects and need for cognitive closure might be based
on the amount and quality of information during opinion formation and the rigidity with
which opinions are firmly held (Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005; Kruglanski and Webster
1996). As Federico, Golec, and Dial (2005) argue, people with a high need for cognitive
closure face discomfort in the face of informational uncertainty. As a result, they want to
reduce such discomfort as soon as possible. Individuals that possess a high need for
closure do not like to engage in extensive or conscious deliberation. Hence, individuals
like this might delegate to credible sources when making up their minds.
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On the other hand, uncertainty does not create much anxiety for people who have
a low need for cognitive closure (Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005). As Federico, Golec,
and Dial (2005) suggest, individuals who possess low need for cognitive closure are less
prone to buy into frames based on simplistic cues. Such individuals do not consider the
costs associated with deliberation and thus are likely to try to weigh all options before
coming to a firm conclusion. Hence in this case they might be less likely to buy into
frames based on the source than those who have a high need for such closure.
Relationship between Framing Environment and Framing Effect
Debate between elites takes place in a multitude of competitive framing
environments. Future work should further explore how exposure to different competing
framing environments affects the framing effect. In this dissertation, each of the frames
presented in competitive environments was presented equally. However, further work
needs to explore environments in which competitive frames are presented unequally in
terms of exposure. Competition between elites is inherently unequal. Imbalances in the
ability of opposing viewpoints may permit one side to essentially gain an advantage in
framing an issue. Further exploring the relationship between exposure and framing effect
will help us to understand how frames can be used to engender support for or opposition
towards preventive war. In short, do frames influence support for or opposition towards
the use of force based on their repetition or frequency? Or is frame influence based on the
considerations they emphasize that might be more or less significant to their constituents?
Relationship between Group, Framing Environment, and Framing Effect
Citizens often look to elites for help to form and shape their opinions. Citizens,
however, not only base their opinions on what they hear from elites, but also on
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discussions they have amongst themselves (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Mendelburg
2002; Mendelsohn 1996; Mutz and Martin 2001; Walsh 2003). Previous work on the
implications of competition and discussion has mostly taken place in isolation, rather
than in conjunction with each other (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Price, Cappella, and
Nir 2002; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Future work should consider the relationship
between the type of framing environment and the effects of different interpersonal
communication environments. As public opinion develops in association with a
particular conflict, one's initial support for war might change based on the group or
groups the individual associates with as well as the frame or frames an individual might
be influenced by. Future work should address the differences presented by polarized and
non-polarized groups. In particular, is there a cancellation of a framing effect or an
enhancement of such effect depending upon personal interaction with a specific group?
Relationship between Time, Framing Environment, and Framing Effect
As Chong and Druckman (2013) argue, how citizens react to counter-frames
determines which policy wins in the forum of public opinion. However, as the authors
point out, we need to examine further how such counter-framing might be successful.
The reality is that counter-framing occurs over time; it is not a static phenomenon. The
effectiveness of counter-frames depends on when they are presented in conjunction from
the original message and how they are repeated over time. Early messages affect people’s
attitudes on issues which then affect how subsequent information is perceived. Thus, the
framing effect is largely dependent on the durability of attitudes formed in response to
earlier communication. Attitudes that are stronger, last longer, and thus may be less
resistant to change than attitudes that are more weakly held. Future research should thus
consider the effects of time and attitude formation on the impact that frames have on
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support for or against the use of force.
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